

## **UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL**

Dear Delegates,

It is with great pleasure that we welcome you to the UFRGSMUN 2008 United Nations Security Council. Our staff has been working most earnestly for the past months to assure you will attend a world class conference, experiencing the most a simulation can offer, learning and enjoying yourselves at the same time.

The Council's agenda for this year's session, which will deal with the situation in Afghanistan and the threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, is perhaps a little more innovative than the ones from previous years. We have decided not only to discuss the situation in one specific region, but to confront you with the very serious problem of terrorism which scourges several countries in different and worrisome ways. You can expect some great thrills from these subjects. You will be working as state representatives, seeking solutions through negotiation, to improve the Afghan scenario, and to tackle the issue of terrorism. Both topics are of great complexity, and that of Afghanistan will require a deep understanding of the country's regional and international insertion.

This year's UNSC team is composed of fourth and sixth semester International Relations undergraduate students. Ana Clara Backes Martins is in the 6th semester, and will be working as the director in this year's UNSC. As a delegate, Ana Clara participated in UFRGSMUN 2005, in the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD); in AMUN 2006, in the Social and Humanitarian Committee (SOCHUM); in UFRGSMUN 2006, in the Historical Security Council (HUNSC); and in MONO 2007 in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). After these experiences, she joined the staff of last year's UFRGSMUN, when she worked as assistant-director, also in the UNSC. She is looking forward to welcoming you all in Porto Alegre, and wishes for you to have the best possible UNSC experience.

Assistant director Gustavo Frota Lima e Silva is in the fourth semester. This is Gustavo's first participation in the Staff of UFRGSMUN. He decided to join us after an extremely fruitful participation in UFRGSMUN 2007, as the representative of Sweden to the UNHCR. In this year's AMUN, he represented Italy in the Security Council. Gustavo has taken special interest in the situation of Afghanistan and intends to further the research he began this year for UFRGSMUN.

Igor Isquierdo Celeste is a sixth semester student and will be an assistant director to the UNSC. This is Igor's second participation in a model, his first as a staff member. Igor is very interested in studying matters of international security, and has for that reason been called to join our team.

Lucas Cé Sangalli, assistant director, is in the 4<sup>th</sup> semester in UFRGS and is also a 4<sup>th</sup> semester student of Social Sciences in Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUC-RS). This is his first participation as a staff member in UFRGSMUN. He also took part in the fifth edition of UFRGSMUN as the Swedish member assigned to the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (SPECPOL). As for other models, he represented the United States of America in the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) in AMUN 2008.

Thabita Fonseca Abraham is in the sixth semester and this is her second participation in modeling, and her first time as a staff member. Last year she joined UFRGSMUN UNSC as the representative of the Republic of Congo. Following that enriching experience, when she showed great diplomatic skills, Thabita was invited to be one of the UNSC's assistant directors. Thabita has also taken a keen interest in the topics to be discussed in the UNSC and wishes to develop more research on the matter.

We wish that this simulation gives you the excitement, challenge and knowledge you are looking for. UFRGSMUN is a terrific opportunity to enhance debating and negotiation skills, and to learn more about the UN system as a whole. We hope you enjoy every second you spend in Porto Alegre in early November. We must remind you that although the Study Guides were written to provide you with a comprehensive view of both topics, they must not be your only source of research: read them, but do not read only them. Also, please join the UNSC egroup ([unsc-ufrgsmun2008@yahoo](mailto:unsc-ufrgsmun2008@yahoo)) so you can get online with your fellow delegates and chair. In case you have any doubts or questions prior to the conference, do not hesitate in contacting us! It will be our utmost pleasure to have you as guests in our University and city!

Yours truly,

**Ana Clara Backes Martins**  
**Director**

**Gustavo Frota Lima e Silva**  
**Assistant-Director**

**Lucas Cé Sangalli**  
**Assistant-Director**

**Igor Isquierdo Celeste**  
**Assistant-Director**

**Thabita Fonseca Abraham**  
**Assistant-Director**

## **UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC) GENERAL BACKGROUND**

The Security Council, according to Chapter V of the UN Charter, is the body primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace and security within the organization's framework. The Council was created on October 24th, 1945, to become the most important body of the UN, as it was the only committee capable of imposing binding resolutions upon nations. This binding nature, one of the Council's most defining characteristics, detaches in many ways the UNSC from other UN forums.

The Security Council was created to have only 11 seats, which were reflective of the balance of global powers of the time. Although the number of seats has been changed to 15, after an amendment to article 23 of UN Charter in 1965, many aspects of the composition of the Security Council are still targets of criticism, and studies on the reformulations on the Council are currently being conducted. The committee has five permanent members, frequently referred to as the P5s, which reflected the most powerful nations of the time in which the Council was created, and among those who were the most active for the creation of the United Nations itself: Republic of China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. These member states have the power to block any substantive decision, in what is commonly referred to as "veto power": if any of them votes against any resolution or clause, for instance, it automatically fails.

The remaining 10 countries are elected by the General Assembly, which has demonstrated through the years the tendency to elect five members from Asia and Africa, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America and two from Western Europe and other states. The sessions of 2008 will be composed of the following States: Belgium, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Indonesia, Italy, Libya, Panama, Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom the United States and Viet Nam. The Presidency of the Council is held by its members in turns of one calendar month each. The order of the presidencies is defined by the English alphabetical order of their names.

Exercising its function within the UN framework, the Security Council issues every year several resolutions on key issues of international politics, affecting directly the lives of millions. Although it is in its mandate to make use of force, by the authorization of unilateral and multilateral military operations, and by the deployment of peacekeeping operations, the Council seldom does so. When dealing with threats to peace and security, the organ has a practice of employing all possible efforts to persuade the parties to reach a friendly agreement, often helping the ceasing of the dispute, either by further investigating or by

mediating it. The body has the power to nominate Special Representatives or request the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative of its own to follow more closely any crisis that might emerge. The Council also frequently uses sanctions, such as embargoes, to create pressure on a given nation or nations, for controversies to be peacefully resolved.

Finally, the UN Charter recognizes the right of a member state which does not have a seat in the Council to participate of its sessions, without the right to vote, when the Council considers that the matter being discusses specially affects the interests of that member.

## **TOPIC AREA A: THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY CAUSED BY TERRORIST ACTS**

By Ana Clara Backes Martins, Gustavo Frota Lima e Silva, Igor Isquierdo Celeste, Lucas Cé Sangalli and Thabita Fonseca Abraham

### **INTRODUCTION**

Tracing the roots of terrorism is not an easy task for two main reasons: the problem of defining what terrorism is, and the difficulties related to the categorization of terrorist acts, that is, the creation of a reliable and acceptable typology to be used when dealing with this subject. Bearing that in mind, writing down the history of such manifestation poses major difficulties and, in order to diminish them, we will use an ample definition of the term. We shall mention that this is not the UN accepted definition due to its wide range of applicability.

For that reason, the definition we will use thorough this text is a widely accepted academic definition of terrorism available in Schmid (1998), that designates terrorism as "an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought."<sup>1</sup>

## **1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

### **1.1. Ancient times and the beginnings of ‘sacred terror’**

According to Gérard Chaliand (2006), terrorism is an instrument or a technique as old as war and using terrorism in order to achieve a political goal, or even in the name of religion

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<sup>1</sup> For further information on the definitions of terrorism accepted by the United Nations, see [http://web.archive.org/web/20070129121539/http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism\\_definitions.html](http://web.archive.org/web/20070129121539/http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html).

is not a technique developed in the last century. Such technique is usually used by the weaker party in the conflict against a stronger one, characterizing what would be called ‘asymmetric warfare’<sup>2</sup>. Such manifestation is a recurrent historical phenomenon, and goes back to the first century C.E. (classical era) when the religious movement of the Jewish Zealots<sup>3</sup>, a murderous sect that helped to incite an uprising against the Roman occupation in Palestine, acted (CHALIAND & BLIND, 2006). Back then, their acts were characterized as terrorism because they were perpetrated during daylight in public markets, preferably on holidays, when crowds congregated in Jerusalem.

Other scholars (LAQUEUR, 2007) prefer to link the roots of terrorism to the middle-eastern<sup>4</sup> sect of the *Assassins* in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The *Assassins* were an offshoot of the Shiite Muslims that appeared in the eleventh century and were suppressed by the Mongols in the thirteenth. The *Assassins*, realizing their enemy was in greater number, planned long-term campaigns of terror carried out by a small disciplined force; and such tactic came out to be a more effective political weapon against the religious oppression infringed by the Seljuqs. Their victims used to be well guarded governors, prefects and caliphs, which had their chances of escaping reduced to virtually none, characterizing the *Assassins* as the precursors of suicide terrorism.

## 1.2. The French Revolution and terrorism in Tsarist Russia

The actual word “terrorism” has its roots at the French Revolution period known as *La Terreur*<sup>5</sup> (1793 – 1794), when revolutionaries were beheaded by the guillotine in public places in order to intimidate other insurrection acts. Terror was used as an instrument of State policy, opening the debate over State terrorism<sup>6</sup>. Even if to some scholars, such techniques should not be considered as terrorism because the State owns the legitimate use of force, terror was seen by its perpetrators as a useful political tool, as noticed by Robespierre: “Terror

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<sup>2</sup> Contemporary definition to asymmetric warfare may refer to “a conflict in which the resources of two belligerents differ in essence and in the struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each other’s characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, the ‘weaker’ combatants attempting to use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality” (TOMES, 2004).

<sup>3</sup> First-century Jewish Zealots are a murderous sect that helped to incite an uprising against the Roman occupation in Palestine. They used unorthodox methods, such as attacking their enemies by daylight, preferably on holidays when crowds congregated in Jerusalem; these acts characterizing its manifestations as implicit with terror.

<sup>4</sup> The regions they occupied are today’s Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

<sup>5</sup> French for *The Terror*.

<sup>6</sup> This term being of such a hard definition due to the fact that it relays not only on the definition of terrorism but also on the range of action of international law and international courts of justice.

is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible”. Almost 40 thousand people were executed in the guillotine during this period in France.

Terrorism spread through different manifestations all around the world, and the systematic use of terrorist practices began in the second half of the nineteenth century. In the United States, it started with the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), an organization formed in 1865 that advocated white supremacy over African Americans and used methods and techniques which consisted of psychological and physical violence in order to oppress and terrorize those people. Few years later, terrorism would manifest itself in England, where, in 1867, the Irish Republican Brotherhood carried out attacks that afterward would be considered as the first acts of republican terrorism to be registered in British history.

Later on, terrorism assumed huge proportions with its manifestation in Tsarist Russia, during the 1870s, at the same time that terrorist tactics were adopted by dissident groups in the Ottoman and British Empire and by some anarchists in Western Europe and the United States. During this period, terrorism usually took the form of assassination attempts on heads of State and bomb attacks on public buildings. Around 1880, the president of France, a Spanish prime minister, an Austrian empress, an Italian king, and two North-American presidents were assassinated by groups that could be deemed as terrorists by current definitions.

From the great number of terrorist movements of the nineteenth century, probably the most important was the *Narodnaya Volya*<sup>7</sup>, even though its operations lasted only from January 1878 until March 1881. In that year the group successfully killed Tsar Alexander II, despite the efforts of the State Police, fact that gave fundamental importance to this movement when considering European terrorism, since its ideas became the hallmark of subsequent actions in the continent. To Walter Laqueur (2001), “this [*Narodnaya Volya*’s period of action] was the apogee of the terror and also its end for more than two decades”.

### **1.3. Terrorism in the beginning of the twentieth century**

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, terrorism was, in general, ideologically inspired. The main targets of that period were usually kings, ministers, and generals, and terrorist operations were frequently carried out by groups of far-right and fascist

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<sup>7</sup> Russian for *People’s Will*.

inspiration, such as the Free Corps in Germany, and the Romanian Iron Guard. With the assassination of the Archduke of Austria in 1914, a new phase was inaugurated, since terrorism started to be used by ultra-nationalist movements. Even though it still occurred on the basis of national conflicts, it was no longer primarily directed against political and military leaders; terrorism became progressively indiscriminate, widely affecting civilian targets.

Throughout the interwar period, terrorist practices were largely used by movements of extreme right, mainly in central and Eastern Europe. During the 1920s and 1930s, terrorism took another form: right-wing fascist terror, as Hitler's brown-shirts and Mussolini's black-shirts began to widely massacre civilians and to use psychological oppression against minorities.

Before the beginning of the Second World War, terrorism was largely used against the British – who administered the Palestine under the auspices of the British Mandate for Palestine, which lasted from 1920 until 1948 – by two major Jewish organizations: the Irgun and the Stern. The Irgun was a militant Jewish group established as a branch of another larger Jewish organization, the Haganah, and operated in Palestine between 1931 and 1948. The Stern was an armed clandestine Jewish faction that acted during the British Mandate of Palestine and aimed to evict the British authorities from the territory, allowing unrestricted immigration of Jews and the formation of a Jewish State. It was firstly called the National Military Organization in Israel, becoming recognized as Lehi until the death of its founder, Avraham Stern.

Both organizations used terrorist techniques in order to achieve their goals and eventually acted together, being considered by the British authority and the UN as terrorist organizations (TELUSHKIN, 1991). The Stern, when still called Lehi, perpetrated the first act of terrorism against the United Nations, with the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948<sup>8</sup>, a case that had many implications (PEDAHZUR, 2002). The creation of the Israeli State is a clear example of the fusion of terrorist technique and religion in order to create or to achieve the independence of a State.

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<sup>8</sup> Count Folke Bernadotte, a Swedish diplomat, was born on January 2, 1895. He played a key role in United Nations efforts to keep peace in the Middle East, and paid the supreme price for his dedicated service. In 1948, after the Security Council declared a truce in the first Arab-Israeli war, he was called upon to mediate an agreement between the sides. This led to the first United Nations peacekeeping operation, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). He was assassinated by extremists on September 17, 1948, in Jerusalem, after he had completed his report to the Security Council. (UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, 1998)

## 1.4. Terrorism after the Second World War

To what point the atrocities committed during the Second World War may be characterized as terrorism is an open debate. For some authors (CHALIAND, 2007), the use of the atomic bomb by the United States of America is a clear demonstration of it, as were the actions of oppression perpetrated by Fascism and Nazism. However, with the unraveling of the events that followed the end of the war, countries, mainly the ones affected by the last wave of colonialism, gave continuity to movements of national independence, which used terrorism as a minor technique in some cases, as a last resort or as the only manner to attack and expose the vulnerability of the ruling power.

### 1.4.1. Contemporary Terrorism (1968 – today)

According to Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (2006) there are four main rupture dates that mark the history of contemporary terrorism; the first one being in 1968, with the establishment of the Latin American and Palestinian matrixes of terrorist manifestations.

#### 1.4.1.1. 1968-1979

The Latin American matrix consists on the “urban guerrilla”, and was the form adopted by Carlos Marighella in Brazil, the Tupamaros in Uruguay, and the Montoneros and other militants of the ERP (*Ejercito Revolucionario Popular*) in Argentina. All of these organizations aimed at the control of the State, and this model was also widely adopted in Europe in subsequent years by the *Rote Armee Fraktion* (1970), better known as Baader-Meinhof; by the *Brigate Rosse* in Italy (1970), and by the *Action Directe* in France (1977). The Latin-American movements disappeared with the end of the regimes they fought, while their European copycats and, above all, the RAF and the *Brigate Rosse*, ended due to internal disagreements. In Europe, only the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), due to popular support, is still successfully active, but has already stopped acting through terrorist means.

The action of ethnic and religious groups seeking change of the *status quo* or secession, such as the IRA (1969) and the Basque *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (1959), copied their model from national struggles for independence, using terror in order to counterbalance their

weakness and lack of resources. Both movements were the main terrorist organizations in Europe.<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, the Palestinian matrix has risen firstly in 1964, through the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was formed in Jerusalem as a political and paramilitary organization and a representative of the Palestinian people, with goals that included the destruction of the State of Israel through armed struggle. This organization was responsible for many terrorist acts against civilians, including the Munich Massacre in the Summer Olympics of 1972 and the Achille Lauro Hijacking in 1985. It was organized in multiple different factions and acted as an umbrella organization with limited control over all of its members.

During the summer of 1968, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, founded in 1967), a secular and nationalist political and military organization part of the PLO (the second-largest of the groups forming the PLO, the largest being the Fatah), hijacked an Israeli airplane from the company El Al and initiated what would become known as trans-state terrorism, which may be interpreted as a substitute to guerrilla, which the Palestinians were not able to perpetrate in territories occupied by Israel after the war of June 1967 (CHALIAND, 2007).

With the placing of their struggle in worldwide media, Palestinian organizations also gave new amplitude to terrorism, beginning its publicitary form<sup>10</sup>. However, the airplane hijacking tactic, so successful before, would have high costs to the organization when it hijacked another plane, from Swissair, in Jarka, Jordan. The organization tried to negotiate the hijacking of the airplane from Swissair without considering the will of the King, culminating with the eradication of the *fedayeen*<sup>11</sup> from the country. The *fedayeen* are also at the foundation of movements such as the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.

Nevertheless, it is important to notice that movements such as the Palestinian Hamas and OLP, and the Lebanese Hizbullah cannot be reduced to “terrorist organizations”. All of

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<sup>9</sup> Despite the efforts taken by the British forces in order to maintain the country united, after thirty years of repression, the IRA settled an agreement with the Ulster Catholics, creating a State. In 2005, the IRA Army Council announced the end to its armed campaign. The ETA, on its term, increasingly lost popular support, which culminated in a cease-fire proposal to the Spanish government in 2006. However, the organization has claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks occurred in 2008.

<sup>10</sup> Publicitary terrorism is a wide definition to any type of terrorism that seeks ample diffusion of its acts through media (CHALIAND, 2007).

<sup>11</sup> Fedayeen are little groups of Palestinian commandos that used armed struggle as their major technique. The name "*fedayeen*" is also used to refer to armed struggle against any form of enslavement basing its actions on resistance (EL-NAWAWY, 2002)

them are political movements making use of the techniques available for them, which mean, most of the time, terrorist techniques as part of what is called asymmetric warfare (CHALIAND, 2007).

#### **1.4.1.2. 1979-1991**

With the rise to power in Iran of Ayatollah Khomeini, a new wave of international terrorism began (CHALIAND, 2007). The Iranian Revolution immediately influenced a great number of Lebanese Shiites, who were favored by the war in Lebanon (1975 – 1982), which turned the country into a sanctuary to Islamic and European terrorist groups who wanted to train with Palestinian organizations, such as the PFLP. With the revolution, Islamic terrorism gradually developed, at one side among Shiites - the Hizbullah being one example - and, at the other side, among Sunnis. They had last fought in Afghanistan, where they resisted Soviet occupation and the local communist government.

The Hizbullah was first established as a militia in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (DAHR, 2006). It drew inspiration from the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, from whom they received training (SHATZ, 2004). The Islamic political and paramilitary organization declared through a manifesto in 1985 its three main goals: to put an end to any colonialist entity in Lebanon (the organization is set in that country since its beginning); to bring the Phalangists to justice for “the crimes they perpetrated”; and to establish the Islamic regime in Lebanon (STALINSKY, 2006). In recent years, however, the organization has been forging alliances across religious lines (SHATZ, 2004). The Hizbullah is widely supported by the Lebanese population, receiving special demonstrations of this support immediately following the 2006 Lebanon War. After this period, the organization has increasingly augmented its military capacities (FRYKBERG, 2008), receiving financial support from countries such as Iran and Syria (UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, 2006).

The organization depicts a new scenario concerning terrorism due to the fact that it is considered a terrorist organization only by the United States, Israel, Canada, and the Netherlands, while Australia and the United Kingdom list only its security arm as a terrorist organization. On the other hand, the Hizbullah has established, inside Lebanese territory, a radio and satellite television-station and programs for social development (DEEB, 2006), conquering an important share of support from the population of the country.

The biggest success of terrorist activities in Middle Eastern countries was the withdrawal of western troops from Lebanon in 1984, which followed the deadly attacks of 1983, when a series of suicidal attacks took place in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 241 American marines and 53 French parachutists. We must also mention the taking over of the American embassy in Tehran from 1979 to 1980, and Irangate, in 1986.<sup>12</sup>

In 1988, the second biggest terrorist attack against the United States occurred, with the destruction of the airplane of Pan Am Flight 103 by Libyan terrorists over the Scottish town of Lockerbie. The bombing is seen as an indirect attack against the US, as 189 of its victims were American. Even though American territory had not been affected until 1993, the main victims of international terrorism have been Americans. More than 400 attempts were registered during the 70s and the 80s, the worst being the attack to the American embassy in Beirut, which killed 63 people in 1983. Almost all terrorist actions during these decades came from the Middle-East, and  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the attempts happened in European soil (CHALIAND, 2007).

By that time, State response to terrorism was modest, even inexistent – the exception being Israel that, since it considered being on war, militarily addressed terrorism (ENTEBBE, 1976). Germany began countering terrorism in 1984, followed by the British in Mogadishu. During the 80s, lower level attacks took place in Europe, being followed by hostage taking, a reedited technique that was used in order to keep negotiations for a longer time than airplane hijackings. The response to terrorism by democratic regimes has been gradual until today, with the implementation of special legislations to deal specifically with terrorist acts.

#### 1.4.1.3. 1991-1993

The third important mark is placed between the years of 1991 and 1993, when a significant modification took place in Afghanistan. From being an instrument used by the United States in order to detain the USSR during the Soviet invasion, radical Islamism became, partially due to the Iraq War in 1991, an independent politico-military movement with multiple ramifications. This period of time was marked as well by the *jihad*<sup>13</sup> movement

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<sup>12</sup> The Irangate is a political scandal that goes back to the Reagan administration, but that was revealed only after his mandate, in 1986. It involved weapon transfers by the part of the United States in exchange of US hostages being held by Hizbullah. Israel would send the arms to the rebels in Iran, and the US would reimburse the country (*The Tower Commission Report*).

<sup>13</sup> *Jihad* is an Arabic word for struggle. It can refer to a struggle to be a better Muslim, or to a struggle to make society more closely aligned with the teachings of the Koran. There is also the *jihad* of the 'hand' or 'sword'. The only time when individuals are enjoined to undertake *jihad* on their own volition is as a response to direct

in Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kashmir. The year of 1993 is also the date of the first attack against the World Trade Center.

But it was only in 1996, in Saudi Arabia and after the attempt of Dahrán, that Osama Bin Laden would ask for the withdrawal of the United States from the sacred territory of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Taliban (1994-1996), formed with the support of the United States in Pakistan, rose to power in the country. Progressively, the influence of Bin Laden and the Egyptians Ahmed al-Zawahiri and Mohamed Atef over the Taliban became effective. In August 1998, the US Embassy bombings brought al-Qaeda<sup>14</sup> to international attention for the first time, when hundreds of people were killed in simultaneous car explosions at the United States embassies in the East African capital cities of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.

Only at the end of the twentieth century new forms of terrorism became relevant, such as cyber and bio-terrorism. An example of the last one was the Tokyo subway sarin incident promoted by the Aum Shinrikyo sect. Between 1990 and 1995, this terrorist group attempted several apparently unsuccessful acts of biological terrorism using botulin toxin, anthrax spores and the cultivation of the Ebola virus.

Currently, revolutionary and separatist movements engaging in terrorism are giving way to religious terrorist organizations. In 1980, only two out of 64 international terrorist groups were considered to be religiously motivated. In 1995, the figure was 26 out of 56. Even though the number of terrorist acts has decreased, those that take place have become more deadly (MINTZ, 2001). Although religiously motivated terrorism grew in importance in the last years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, politically motivated acts still happened. In April 1995, the US suffered a manifestation of domestic terrorism, with the Oklahoma City bombing, an attack aimed at the Alfred Murrah Federal Building. Its responsible, Timothy McVeigh, apparently had political revenge motivations against the US government

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external aggression or invasion of Islamic territories. For instance, the Palestinian group Hamas defend its actions against Israel in terms of recovering and restoring lost Islamic territory (BAYLIS & SMITH, 2008).

<sup>14</sup> Al-Qaeda was founded in 1988 by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (succeeded by Osama Bin Laden), and is one of the largest terrorist organizations of our days, which consists of an international alliance of Sunni Islamic militants who have as its main objectives the end of foreign influence over Muslim countries and the creation of a new Islamic caliphate. Bearing in mind the worldwide spread of western culture, which is mainly related to the United States, the organization goes strictly against not only western cultural influence, but also American culture. It attacked civilian and military targets in various countries, the most notable being the September 11, 2001 attacks. Due to its secrecy and structure of semi-autonomous cells, al-Qaeda's size and degree of responsibility for particular attacks are difficult to be established.

#### 1.4.1.4. 2001 - Present days

The beginning of the twenty-first century witnessed the largest terrorist attack to date. On September 11, 2001, nineteen terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda hijacked four commercial passenger jet airplanes and crashed two of them into the World Trade Center and one into the Pentagon. With the complete collapse of the Twin Towers, nearly 3,000 people died. The attacks also prompted drastic changes in the United States foreign and domestic policy and security protocol, and placed national security at the forefront of the political dialogue.

Not only the United States suffered with the menace of terror. On March 11, 2004, a series of coordinated bombings took place at the *Cercanías*, a commuter train system in Madrid. Further investigation revealed that the attacks were directed by an al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist cell, although no direct al-Qaeda participation has been established. A similar attack occurred in London in July 7, 2005, when a series of coordinated bomb blasts hit London's public transport system. Those explosions constituted the largest and deadliest terrorist attack in the history of London, killing 52 people and injuring another 700 civilians.

Contemporary terrorism has substantially changed its means in order to achieve its objectives. The Hamas and the al-Qaeda combine political and pseudo-political objectives, such as the destruction of Israel and the United States of America, with a religious base that is used for the recruitment of new members. One must stress that the terrorist acts performed by Palestinians were essentially political and laic, having the religious character appeared only after the Iranian Revolution, during the 1980s.

Also, especially in ethnically motivated terrorism, acts of violence have been indiscriminate. Relatively few political leaders or other prominent public figures were killed, and the strategy became to assassinate as many members of the enemy group as possible. New terrorist groups appear to be more decentralized and loosely knit if compared with older groups, which had a clearly defined leadership structure. They also tend to be less willing to issue *communiqués* explaining and taking credit for their attacks.

In general, the use of terror is a technique of strain in order to achieve concessions from the State and a solution for the cause of fighting. The contemporary Islamic case is particular because it differs from precedent movements: it does not have a particular issue to negotiate and, when concerning al-Qaeda, it acts through semi-autonomous cells, allowing the organization to promote acts such as the one on September 1, 2004, in a school in Beslan, Russian Federation, when a group of armed terrorists, demanding the end of the Second

Chechen War, took more than 1,100 schoolchildren and adults as hostages. The tragedy led to security and political repercussions in Russia, most notably a series of government reforms consolidating power in the Kremlin and the strengthening of the powers of the President of Russia, demonstrating how terrorist acts have been used in order to legitimize military and political State decisions in our century.

More recently, on December 27, 2007, the former prime-minister and candidate to presidency of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, was assassinated while leaving a campaign rally for her party at Liaquat. The current commander of al-Qaeda, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, claimed responsibility for the attack, describing Bhutto as "the most precious American asset on the country". Her assassination gave way to civil upheaval against the government and turned the country's elections into special turmoil. Further destabilization of the country indicates the possibility of the establishment of al-Qaeda in it, after the organization lost its safe haven in the neighbor country, Afghanistan (THE ECONOMIST, 2008).

## **2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE**

### **2.1. Definition, Causes and Goals of Terrorism**

#### **2.1.1. The concept issue**

The fight against terrorism and the creation of an effective counterterrorist strategy finds considerable obstacles in the definition of *terrorism* and of what are the terrorists' motivations and goals. These aspects are fundamental to the prevention and combat of terrorism but, despite the large discussion on the subject, there is still no universal consensus about any of these matters.

The problem of defining terrorism and the reluctance of UN member States to agree on an anti-terrorist convention have restrained the United Nations capacity to develop a comprehensive strategy on counterterrorism, since the lack of a consensual definition prevents it from fully exerting its moral authority and from sending the message that "terrorism is never an acceptable tactic, even for the most defensible of causes" (UN, 2004). By a set of norms and laws<sup>15</sup>, the UN has regulated and constrained States' decisions to use force and

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<sup>15</sup> Including the Charter of the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court

their conduct in war, whereas the norms governing the use of force by non-State actors have not yet achieved the same degree of normative strength.

Agreeing on a definition usually stumbles into two issues: the first is the assertion that any definition should include States' use of armed forces against civilians. The second objection is the allegation that peoples under foreign occupation have a right to resistance and a definition of terrorism should not override this right. Although the right to resistance is alleged by some, the central point is that there is nothing in the fact of occupation that justifies the targeting and killing of civilians. On the description which is closest to the United Nations', terrorism can be defined as "any action, in addition to the ones already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act" (UN, 2004).

### **2.1.2. Causes and Motivations**

Similar to the lack of consensus regarding what exactly *is* terrorism, there is a large number of different theoretical approaches to explain *why* terrorism happens.

To the Multicausal Approach, terrorism results from a combination of causal factors – psychological, economic, political, religious and social, and it would be simplistic and erroneous to try to explain an act of terrorism by a single cause. Wilkinson (1977) argues that the same causes for revolution and political violence are causes for terrorism, such as ethnic, religious and ideological conflicts, poverty, modernization stresses, political inequities, lack of peaceful communication channels, tradition of violence, the existence of revolutionary groups, governmental weakness and ineptness, erosions of confidence in a regime, and deep divisions within governing elites and leadership groups. Krueger (2008) argues, in contrast, that poverty would not be a cause for terrorism, considering that terrorists tends to be drawn from well-educated middle-class or high-income families. To understand that argument, it is necessary to bear in mind that there are two different types of terrorist: the leaders and common individuals, who are generally recruited by the organization. Their motivations are different and, beyond poverty or dissatisfaction with the social context, new recruits are often young people who want to join not only because they identify with the cause and idolize the

group's leader, but also because they want to belong to a group for a sense of self-importance and companionship.

The Political Approach believes that the root causes of terrorism are environmental factors, such as the influence of revolutionary theories in university, for example. Martha Crenshaw (1981) says that there are permissive factors that motivate terrorism by facilitating its actions – including urbanization, transportation system, communications media, weapons availability, and the absence of security measures.

The Organizational Approach sees terrorism as a rational course of action taken by a group and which is not necessarily committed in an individual level. As Crenshaw (1990) affirms, “acts of terrorism are committed by groups who reach collective decisions based on commonly held beliefs, although the level of individual commitment to the group and its beliefs varies.” To Hudson (1999), *bona fide* terrorist groups are often totally dominated by a single individual leader, as the al-Qaeda is by Osama bin Laden. Hudson states that it is quite improbable that the terrorist groups of such dominating leaders make their decisions collectively. By most accounts, the established terrorist leaders give instructions to their recruits, while operational details are for them to work out alone.

Finally, there is also the Psychological Approach, which is concerned with explaining how recruitment and induction into terrorist groups are made, as well as terrorists' personalities, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and careers. To Maxwell Taylor (1988), the basic characteristic of terrorists is their notion “that their violent acts stem from feelings of rage and hopelessness engendered by the belief that society permits no other access to information-dissemination and policy-formation processes.” Individuals who become terrorists are often unemployed, socially alienated, and at the margin of society. Those with little education may try to join a terrorist group with the desire to be part a cause they regard as just. The more educated youths may be motivated more by genuine political or religious convictions. Generally, terrorists tend to be in their twenties, and to be healthy and strong. There are relatively few older terrorists, which usually are the leaders (HUDSON, 1999).

### **2.1.3. The goals of terrorism**

As for terrorism's concept and causes, defining the ultimate goals of terrorists is a complex task. The strategic model<sup>16</sup> defines terrorists as rational actors who attack civilians for political ends, fitting the explanation which says that terrorism is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups, usually intended to influence an audience”<sup>17</sup>. Kydd and Walter (2006) affirm that the goals driving terrorist organizations are usually political, which determine whether and how the terrorist campaign will be launched. The immediate victims, in these cases, are not as important as the message sent to the public. Through the choice of their targets, which are often symbolic or representative of the targeted nation, terrorists attempt to create a high-profile impact on the public, compensating the limited material resources which are usually at their disposal.

In other words, this model assumes terrorism as an extremism of means, not ends (KYDD & WALTER, 2006). The goals to be reached (modulated by terrorists' political preferences) vary over time and place, but in general respond to: regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control and *status quo* maintenance. Regime change seeks to depose a government and replace it with one led by the terrorist group in question, or which is favorable to it. The pursuit of territorial change intends to take a territory away from a state either to establish a new State<sup>18</sup> or to join another one. Al-Qaeda's demand that the United States drop its support to Israel could be defined as a policy objective, whereas social control is used by the terrorist organization to constrain the individuals' behavior rather than the state. By the *status quo* maintenance, the terrorist organization intends to support the existing regime or power arrangement against political groups seeking to change it, receiving in return protection or even some part of the regime's power.

## 2.2 Terrorist Strategies

When practicing terrorism, a group or organization seeks to achieve substantial concessions from the governments they deal with. To reach this goal, a wide number of

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<sup>16</sup> The strategic model rests on three core assumptions: (1) terrorists are motivated by relatively stable and consistent political preferences; (2) terrorists evaluate the expected political payoffs of their available options, or at least the most obvious ones; and (3) terrorism is adopted when the expected political return is superior to those of alternative options.

<sup>17</sup> This definition, extracted from the Title 22 of the United States Code (1998), has become debatable over time, especially regarding terms as “politically motivated” and “non-combatants” (LAQUEUR, 2003).

<sup>18</sup> As the Tamil Tigers seek to do in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka.

strategies is used. Those strategies, as understood by Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter (2006), can be categorized in five main logics that drive terrorism: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling and outbidding.

A systematization of these strategies is possible through the combination of three subjects of uncertainty (power, resolve, and trustworthiness) with two stages of persuasion used by terrorists (the enemy’s government and/or the domestic population). The same may be applied to the analysis of relations between terrorists and governments, as States are uncertain about terrorists’ power and resolve in the same way that they cannot trust verbal statements from members of terrorist organizations. For a better understanding of the theory, Figure 1, from KYDD & WALTER (2006), will be used.

Figure 1. Strategies of Terrorist Violence

		Target of Persuasion	
		Enemy	Own Population
Subject of Uncertainty	Power	attrition	intimidation
	Resolve		outbidding
	Trustworthiness	spoiling	provocation

The attrition strategy is designed to accomplish one of the most important tasks to terrorist organizations: to persuade the enemy that the group is strong and resolute enough to impose considerable costs in case its demands are not taken into account. That way, in an attrition campaign, the greater the costs an organization can inflict, the more efficient future attacks tend to be, as the targets become more likely to grant political concessions.

On the other hand, the strategy of intimidation works as a way to demonstrate that a certain terrorist group has the power to punish whomever disobeys it, regardless of the government’s actions. Such strategy is often used when a terrorist organization wishes to overthrow a government in power or gain control over a given population.

The third strategy to be used by terrorists is called provocation. It works in a way as to induce an indiscriminate response by an enemy regarding a terrorist act. Through this response, terrorists try to radicalize the populations involved in a given dispute, moving them to support their causes. The logic of such strategy can be understood if we take into account that terrorist organizations are usually much more hostile to the regime they oppose to than the majority of the population. This way, the provocation strategy is designed to persuade the domestic audience that the target of attack is untrustworthy and must be resisted.

The spoiling strategy also uses trustworthiness as the subject of uncertainty. Terrorists usually resort to such strategy when trying to prevent an agreement between the target government and moderate leaders on their side. Spoiling works by playing on the mistrust these groups have for one another and succeeds when one or both parties fail to sign or implement a settlement.

The last strategy employed by terrorist organizations is outbidding. It basically consists in using violence to persuade a given population that, in relation to their government, terrorists have greater resolve to fight a given enemy, and therefore are worthy of support.

The importance of understanding these terrorist strategies lies on the fact that, as terrorism has arguably proven to be an efficient tool for achieving political objectives several times in the past, the international community can expect that it may be increasingly applied in the future. This is especially notorious if the advantages the globalization process brings to the spread of terrorism are taken into account. With the enlargement of fear in target populations by the use of the internet and other communication tools, terrorist acts may impel governments and individuals to respond to terrorist demands in a more effective way. Bearing that in mind, it is evident that strategies to contend terrorism will become more and more necessary. Thus, in order to effectively fight this threat, the international community must understand the ways terrorists seek their objectives.

### **2.3. Counterterrorism Issues**

In this section three major elements taken into account when countering and discouraging terrorism will be defined. In response to a terrorist attack, policy-makers and other authorities are faced with these elements, combining their view on the subject in targeted strategies against terrorism and specific terrorist organizations. The first element we

will deal with is the matter of getting at the root causes of a given attack, and of terrorism in general. The argument for searching the causes of terrorism is that, to respond to an attack effectively, one must understand what has motivated it, and there enters the second important element, which is that of information gathering and sharing. To fight a terrorist movement, intelligence organs must be given the highest priority: “the gathering of intelligence on the nature of the enemy’s intentions, resources, plans and intended activities is a central need in any form of conflict, and terrorism is no exception” (SEMLSER, 2008). The third element is that of the use of force, of when it is necessary and how it is and should be employed. Other important issues to be taken into consideration in counterterrorism efforts are the role of the media, and the better insertion in society of individuals from communities prone to terrorism.

### **2.3.1. The root causes and motivations**

Getting to the root causes of terrorism is a task scholars and policy-makers have been trying to accomplish for years. This search for the general root causes of terrorism derives mainly from the idea that once the structural motivations of a terrorist organization are identified and combated, the organization itself will cease to exist. Recent researches, such as those presented by Smelser (2008) and Abrahms (2008), point out to a different direction, one which considers these organizations as a socialization network for the individuals taking part in them, and which considers terrorism as the “result of a complex combination and accumulation of conditions and causes and that, by the time actual terrorist activity crystallizes, it is not only remote from general influences but also develops an internal momentum largely independent of those causes” (SMELSER, 2008). The bottom line in that idea is that by simply keeping terrorists from reaching their political goals, terrorist organizations will not end. In this point of view, not only must the political and violent goals of terrorists be combated, but also the bonds between members of terrorist organizations.

Taking this evidence into account, we will not stress the importance of the general causes of terrorism, but only the relevance of knowing the specific motivations behind a given attack. If governments and other actors involved in the response to a terrorist attack act in a manner that does not consider its motivations, the terrorist cause itself might end up being put forward by the counterterrorist actions. Hasty responses might end up feeding one of the bases of terrorism, which is its capacity to instill fear in target populations.

### **2.3.2. Intelligence issues**

When a terrorist organization is based more on members' affinity than on its political goals, a successful strategy must not only keep them from reaching those goals, but target the structure of the organization and the relationship between its participants. In those cases violent responses could help lift the feeling of compassion within the organization, lifting terrorists' morale in the name of vengeance. On the other hand, if a long term strategy would be adopted, concentrated on precise intelligence and the hardening of possible targets, the organization could come to an end.

The importance of intelligence in dealing with terrorism is widely agreed upon among students of the phenomenon. Precise information can both guarantee that counterterrorist measures will be aimed at the right target, and prevent these measures from accidentally affecting innocent civilians. There are, however, many difficulties regarding information gathering when it comes to terrorism, especially with its current international manifestations.

The nature of contemporary terrorism is one of the greatest difficulties intelligence gathering initiatives face. "The contemporary terrorist situation of fluid, elusive, and mobile cells of potential imposes a new level of difficulty of tracking and infiltration, because units are forever appearing and disappearing in different places and different forms" (SMELSER, 2008). The secretiveness of terrorist organizations and the fact that they are mainly recruited among close relations means they have generally high internal cohesiveness and great suspicion of outsiders, and that also hampers intelligence works.

The greatest obstacle to a better use of intelligence in discouraging terrorism is the low level of information sharing both in national and international levels. Most countries today have separated agencies dealing with different aspects of intelligence gathering. These agencies generally face bureaucratic constraints to the sharing of information. On the international level, these restrictions are met with the resistance of breaking national sensitivities, even though countries generally agree on the practicality of sharing data on "suspects, movements of persons and organizations' activities" (SMELSER, 2008).<sup>19</sup> When the physical dismantling of a terrorist organization is sought, countries also seem to face great difficulties.

### **2.3.3. International Cooperation and the use of force**

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<sup>19</sup> The UN system has stemmed several efforts to increase information-sharing, especially through the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, which will be further dealt with in the "Previous International Action" part of this text.

When terrorism was mainly a domestic matter, that is, when terrorist attacks derived mainly from nationals of one country seeking a political outcome inside that country, terrorist movements had much shorter lives. That is because police and political actors in that country had all liberties guaranteed by law to repress those movements and persecute the people involved with them. When terrorist organizations became scattered throughout several countries, coordination between coercive actors of each different nation to reach the same kind of response became greatly complicated, if not impossible. “The police, military, and security forces of nations that have been attacked or that face the threat of attack cannot simply move into another country without authorization unless the nation that has been attacked goes to war with the attacker or otherwise violates its sovereignty” (SMELSER, 2008). Other important deterrents to cooperation between countries in matters of terrorism are questions such as differences in the understanding of terrorism and different population composition.

As for the direct use of force, it is only possible when done against the terrorist organization itself, aiming at members most dedicated to the cause advocated by the organization. The use of military force against people considered to be supporters, sympathizers and neutrals is largely perceived as “misdirected and politically counterproductive” (SMELSER, 2008). When taken against a State with proved links with terrorist organizations, or which is itself a perpetrator of terrorism, military intervention is perceived to be justifiable, even though empiric evidence points to the limited efficacy of large-scale military operations.

Since terrorist organizations are volatile and extremely mobile, employing a military campaign against States who shelter them tends to be of little efficiency in dismantling the organization, but successful in ousting the terror-aligned regime. An example was given in 2001, when forces of Operation Enduring Freedom achieved great success in freeing Afghanistan from the Taliban regime, but which showed relatively small outcomes in destroying al Qaeda. To reach the core of complex terrorist organizations, the use of precise information to render “strategic and surgical” (SMELSER, 2008) attacks is necessary.

#### **2.3.4. Psychological and Group approaches**

As important as the identification of terrorist cells’ location and the thorough comprehension of terrorist goals is the understanding of the organization’s structure, its appeal to new recruits and the type of relationship between its members. Abrahms (2008)

concluded through empirical analyses that the vast majority of terrorist organizations are composed of men with close family and friendship ties. It is also argued that, in some level, terrorists remain with their organizations to preserve the bonds created within it. Several acknowledged terrorists, especially those in the lower hierarchical level of terrorist organizations, when questioned by researchers affirm they joined the organization not for a special connection to “their political or ideological agendas, but to maintain or develop social relations with other terrorist members” (ABRAHMS, 2008). Another interesting field explored by researchers is that of the psychological traits of terrorists.

An important point for researchers in the field of psychology of terrorism is that, contrary to a widely spread stereotype, terrorists in general are not diagnostically psychopathic or mentally sick. On the opposite, terrorist groups tend to recruit members who have a normal or average physical appearance, in means to prevent that the terrorist’s physical appearance betray his identity as a terrorist. Complementally, Victoroff (2005) points out that even though terrorists are “extremely heterogeneous psychologically”, some four main personality characteristics can be seen in most terrorists:

1. High affective valence regarding an ideological issue;
2. A personal stake — such as strongly perceived oppression, humiliation, or persecution; an extraordinary need for identity, glory, or vengeance; or a drive for expression of intrinsic aggressiveness — that distinguishes him or her from the vast majority of those who fulfill characteristic;
3. Low cognitive flexibility, low tolerance for ambiguity, and elevated tendency toward attribution error;
4. A capacity to suppress both instinctive and learned moral constraints against harming innocents, whether due to intrinsic or acquired factors, individual or group forces - probably influenced by a, b, and c (VICTOROFF, 2005).

These findings are extremely important to counterterrorism measures, because they can be taken into account in the delineation of a strategy. Acknowledging that terrorists value more the social side of an organization than its political pursuit, and that they generally have feelings of oppression and humiliation towards the target society, can change the focus of a State’s counterterrorist approach, or at least diversify it. Strategies that consider that can emphasize more on infiltration of terrorist cells and in harming terrorists bonds, then in solely

keeping them from reaching their declared political goals. Perceiving the high affinity between members of the Brigade Rosse, the Italian government “by commuting prison sentences in the early 1980s in exchange for actionable intelligence against their fellow Brigatisti”, infiltrated the organization and “bred mistrust and resentment among the members, and quickly rolled up the organization” (ABRAHMS, 2008). Also, Law enforcement’s focus against terrorism, taking into account the general characteristics of terrorists should probably “pay greater attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden” (ABRAHMS, 2008)

### **2.3.5. The Role of the Media**

Since terrorist strikes themselves are generally limited in their effect on the population, terrorists tend to rely greatly on media coverage of attacks. The role of the media is considered key for terrorists to spread psychological, economic, and political effects. “Because terrorist attacks immediately result in increased viewer attention to the media, the content of that media is extremely important” (KRUEGER, 2008). For reasons such as the necessity to draw viewers’ attention, the low accountability of experts on television, the tendency of terrorist groups to distort the coverage on their attacks and the high secrecy on the governments’ side when regarding terrorism, journalistic accounts of the issue may be prone to error.

Since viewers tend to pay heightened attention during the immediate coverage of an attack, and since the public, especially in democratic societies, can pressure its government into action according to its perception of that attack and of the organization that perpetrated it, the role of the media is extremely important and must be taken into account. Efforts to inform the general public in that respect could be a sensible way to minimize the effects of terrorist attacks without resorting to undemocratic alternatives that could harness the freedom of the press. Furthermore, the media is important not only in the target country; the success of terrorism depends largely on the impression it makes on its potential supporters, and they frequently attempt to manipulate the press into expressing their own view of the operations. If counterterrorism actors were to consider that more deeply, they could work as to show reliable data on terrorist activities to the public, diminishing its potential support. “One of the main ways to discourage terrorism is to delegitimize it and limit its support from its main audiences” (SMELSER, 2008).

### 3-PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION

#### 3.1. Actions Before 2001

It is undeniable that terrorism is a prevalent and pernicious harm to worldwide stability. The United Nations Security Council's first reference to terrorists was made in 1948, in response to the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte, who was, at the time, working in the Middle East as a UN official

In September 1963, the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board of Aircrafts, which applied to acts of terrorism affecting in-flight safety, was signed. Since then, the international community has elaborated 13 legal instruments to prevent terrorist acts. In spite of the international concern, it is notorious that, until 1970, terror was considered a domestic matter; that is to say, it was treated as an isolated and localized event, rather than as part of a pattern that needed to be frontally addressed (BAILEY, 1993).

In September 1970, the Security Council adopted its first resolution on terrorism treating the problem as a global issue. Resolution 286 called on "States to take possible legal steps to prevent further hijackings or any other interference with international civil air travel" (S/RES/286 – 1970). Various events in 1972, such as the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Summer Olympics in Munich, definitively brought terrorism to the international agenda. Following this consciousness, the General Assembly adopted two counterterrorism related conventions: the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons (1973) and the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979).

A change in the treatment of terrorism by the International Community began in the 1980's, when the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980) criminalized "the unlawful possession, use, transfer, or theft of nuclear material and threats to use nuclear material to cause death, serious injury or substantial property damage". Concerning terrorism, the year of 1985 was particularly harsh, as several attacks took place<sup>20</sup>. UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuéllar condemned the "unjustifiable and criminal hijacking as well as other acts of terrorism, including hostage-taking" (CUÉLLAR, 1985). In 1989, the Security Council passed two resolutions regarding the implications of terrorism to

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<sup>20</sup> Among the most visible incidents were the hijacking of a TWA flight from Athens to Rome, the kidnapping of Soviet diplomats in Beirut, the murder of eleven Supreme Court judges in Bogotá, and the bombing and destruction of an Air India flight over the Atlantic (SCIOLINO, 1985).

international security: Resolution 635 (S/RES/635 – 1989), calling on the International Civil Aviation Organization and on member States to develop means to detect plastic explosives, and Resolution 638 (S/RES/638 – 1989), labeling hostage-taking and abduction as serious violations of international humanitarian law. One of the main challenges for the Council during the 1980's was how to address counterterrorist actions by member States.

Concerned by the world-wide persistence of acts of international terrorism, the UNSC imposed, on the course of the 1990's, diplomatic, arms, and economic sanctions on Libya, the Sudan, and Afghanistan for their support to terrorist activities. As an example, Resolutions 638 (S/RES/638 – 1989) and 883 (S/RES/883 – 1993) froze the assets of the Libyan government, and imposed a series of aviation, arms and diplomatic sanctions, following that country's refusal to cooperate in the investigations to turn over the suspects in the bombings of Pan Am flight 103.

In 1994, the General Assembly redirected its attention to the issue of terrorism through the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (A/RES/49/60 – 1994). A supplement to this Declaration established an Ad Hoc Committee in 1996. Both the resolution and the Committee made considerable progress in the elaboration of international instruments to fight terrorist attacks, such as the Conventions on Terrorist Bombings and Terrorist Financing<sup>21</sup>.

### **3.2. Actions after September 11**

The Council's counterterrorism activity advanced greatly after September 11, 2001. Resolution 1368 (S/RES/1368), adopted one day after the attacks, acknowledged the right of individual and collective self-defense under the UN Charter, while Resolution 1390 (2002), along with subsequent related resolutions, tightened sanctions on the Taliban and al-Qaeda and froze all financial assets of these organization's associates.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, Resolution 1373 (S/RES/1373), unanimously adopted by the UNSC, established a 15-member Counter-Terrorism Committee, with the objective of monitoring the implementation of the resolution,

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<sup>21</sup> International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)

<sup>22</sup> As a means to monitor the sanctions against Taliban, Resolution 1267 (1999) established the Security Council's 1267 Committee. The sanctions regime has been modified and strengthened by subsequent resolutions, including 1390 (2002), which subsequently included the al-Qaeda organization in the regime. According to the United Nations, under the al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions regime, 34 States have frozen at least \$93.4 million in assets.

which required member States to “refrain from providing any form of support to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts”, making it mandatory for all States to eliminate the financing of terrorism. During the same meeting, governments were required to “share information about possible terrorist activities and to report to the CTC on the steps taken to implement their 1373 obligations”. (LUCK, 2004)

Since its creation, the CTC has been seeking to help particular States to meet improving administrative practices. It “has identified the technical assistance needs of 90 Member States, conducted numerous field visits and created a directory on standards, practices and sources of counter-terrorism assistance” as well as assessed the relevant financial legislation of all 192 member States and provided recommendations for improvements (UN ACTION TO COUNTER TERRORISM, 2006). The Committee, however, is not a direct provider of capacity-building assistance, but acts in connecting States in need of assistance with those with large available resources. Seeking to enhance the work of the CTC, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1535 (2004), which created the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), responsible for providing specialized advice on topics related to Resolution 1373. In order to follow up the implementation of Resolution 1373, the CTC began to carry out country visits, led by CTED visit teams, which also included experts from organizations such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). The European Union, the African Union and other regional organizations also provide technical assistance in strengthening State capacity.

In 2004, the Security Council created, through Resolution 1540, another counter-terrorism related body: the 1540 Committee, which obliges States to refrain from supporting, by any means, non-State actors from developing, acquiring, possessing, transporting, transferring or using weapons of mass destruction, be them nuclear, chemical or biological. Also in 2004, the Council established, through Resolution 1566, the 1566 Working Group, which has the task of examining “practical measures to be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee” and “the possibility of establishing an international fund to compensate victims of terrorist acts and their families” (S/RES/1566).

In March 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched proposals for a “comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy”, identifying five key elements as basic pillars:

dissuading groups from resorting to terrorism; denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack; deterring States from supporting terrorist groups; developing State capacity to prevent terrorism; defending human rights in the context of terrorism and counterterrorism. Following this framework, the Secretary General presented to the General Assembly, also in March 2005, the “In larger Freedom” report. In that document, he asked all States to agree on a new security consensus, by which they committed themselves to treat any threat to one of them as a threat to all, and to work together to prevent catastrophic terrorism, stop the proliferation of deadly weapons, end civil wars, and build lasting peace in war-torn countries. Among his specific proposals, the Secretary General asked States to complete, sign and implement the Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism and the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism (A/59/2005).

The 2005 World Summit was an extraordinary meeting under the General Assembly 60<sup>th</sup> session, in which Heads of State and Government gathered for a three-day High-level Plenary Meeting, deciding on a range of significant proposals in the areas of development, human rights and security. In the 60<sup>th</sup> session, international leaders concluded a draft convention on international terrorism, agreeing for the first time on a clear and unqualified condemnation of terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes” (A/RES/60/1). In conjunction to the World Summit, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1624 (S/RES/1624 – 2005), calling upon States to report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee “as part of an ongoing dialogue”, and to adopt measures to prohibit terrorist acts by law, and inciting them to deny safe haven to anyone guilty of such conduct.

In 2006, the Secretary-General refined his counterterrorism strategy proposals, releasing the “Uniting Against Terrorism” report, which contained recommendations for a global counterterrorism strategy (A/60/825 - 2006). The strategy (United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy)<sup>23</sup>, adopted on September 8, 2006 in the form of a resolution (A/RES/60/288), marks the first time that countries agreed to a common strategic approach to fight terrorism based on the five pillars previously presented by Kofi Annan. Annexed to the

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<sup>23</sup> The first review of the Global Strategy to Counter-Terrorism was made on September 4, 2008, in the 62<sup>th</sup> General Assembly meeting.

resolution is an important Plan of Action, which defines practical steps<sup>24</sup> to be taken collectively and individually to prevent and combat terrorism.

Supported by the UN Global strategy of 2006, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Task Force (CTITF)<sup>25</sup>, established in July 2005, represents a practical work to ensure coordinated and coherent efforts of the UN to counter terrorism. The Task Force has nine Working Groups<sup>26</sup> and is composed of representatives from various organs of the UN, such as the Counter-terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Expert Staff of the 1540 Committee. Recent counterterrorism legal instruments were created this year, as the Global Survey on Implementation of Resolution 1373 (June, 2008), prepared in 2008 by the CTED, was made in different regions around the world. The survey attempted to identify those countries where progress has been made and those where gaps still remain, and suggested where the international community might most usefully focus its counterterrorism efforts in the near future. The survey also contained analysis on the major thematic areas dealt with in the resolution, notably counterterrorism legislation, border control, law enforcement, countering the financing of terrorism, and protection of human rights while countering terrorism. On July 7, 2008, the International Convention against Nuclear Terrorism (2005) came into force as an international treaty, with 22 ratifications<sup>27</sup>. Under the convention, all parties to the treaty will have to co-operate in preventing terrorist attacks by sharing information and assisting each other with criminal investigations and extradition proceedings.

Furthermore, each agency, department or program of the United Nations also provides assistance to member States on their counterterrorism efforts, evidently focusing on its

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<sup>24</sup> The Plan of Action consists of four practical measures: Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; Measures to prevent and combat terrorism; Measures to build State capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard; and Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.

<sup>25</sup> In July 2008, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched a report with the compilation of activities undertaken by the Task Force (A/62/898 – 2008)

<sup>26</sup> The nine Working Groups of the Task Force are: Preventing and Resolving Conflicts, Addressing Radicalization and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism, Supporting and Highlighting Victims of Terrorism, Preventing and Responding to WMD Attacks, Tackling the Financing of Terrorism, Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, Facilitating the Integrated Implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Strengthening the Protection of Vulnerable Targets, and Protecting Human Rights While Countering Terrorism.

<sup>27</sup> The 22 ratifying parties that have expressed their willingness to implement the treaty are: Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Comoros, Croatia, Czech, Republic Denmark, El Salvador, Hungary, India, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (JANES INFORMATION GROUP)

specialty. For example, while the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) provides countries with assistance in counter-terrorism legislation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) addresses development and governance issues, and the World Health Organization, for another hand, promotes measures to address the threat of bio-terrorism.

#### 4. BLOC POSITIONS

Radical Islamic fundamentalist groups pose a major threat to **United States** and friendly regimes' interests. The nation recognizes terrorism as an impending force to its foreign policy when eroding international stability, and the country's policy when regarding terrorism is based on four major guiding principles for counterterrorism strategy: "(I) make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals; (II) bring terrorists to justice for their crimes; (III) isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior; and (IV) bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and require assistance" (OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, 2008).

Past American administrations have exercised a range of options to fight international terrorism, from diplomacy, international cooperation and constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, protective security measures, and military force. According to the United States of America Department of State, "the application of sanctions is one of the most frequently used anti-terrorist tools of U.S. policymakers [and] governments supporting international terrorism<sup>28</sup> (as identified by the Department of State) are prohibited from receiving U.S. economic and military assistance" (PERL, 2001). Among major supporters of the American counterterrorism policy are countries such as Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Jordan, the Philippines, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

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<sup>28</sup> According to the U.S. Department of State, State sponsors of terrorism are the ones that "provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups". The State Department also claims that "without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have greater difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations. [...] Some of these countries also have the capability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that could get into the hands of terrorists." Currently, Cuba, Iran, and Syria are part of the list because, according to the United States, these countries "have not renounced terrorism or made efforts to act against Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Iran and Syria routinely provided safe haven, substantial resources, and guidance to terrorist organizations." On the other hand, the Sudan has been demonstrating the will to act against terrorism, and has been drawn back from the list; the same occurred to Libya years before (USDS, 2007).

The **Republic of Costa Rica** strongly condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, not condoning any political, philosophical, racial, ethnic, or religious movement that makes use of such threat. In order to counter terrorist activities, the country defends the adoption of a permanent, centralized and uniform policy in order to prevent and prosecute international terrorist actions. For the country, the coordinated and multilateral action in order to achieve significant results in accordance with human rights is of fundamental importance. In order to do so, the establishment of a professional, impartial, and permanent organ in the core of the structure of the United Nations would be necessary.

Over the past years, the **United Kingdom** rearranged its governmental structures to better address the issue of terrorism. Changes included the creation of an office of security and counterterrorism to coordinate all intra-governmental counterterrorism efforts, and the establishment of a research, intelligence, and communication unit (RICU) to lead British efforts to develop coherent messaging for domestic and international audiences on terrorism issues. Since early 2003, the government has been implementing a long-term strategy to counter international terrorism. Known as Contest, the strategy consists of four main axes: (1) prevent terrorism by stopping people from becoming or supporting terrorists or violent extremists; (2) pursue terrorists and those that sponsor them; (3) protect the public, key national services, and United Kingdom interests overseas; and (4) prepare for the consequences of terrorist attacks.

**France** is one the most active countries engaged with the activities of the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), the G8's Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG), and the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee (for the Taliban and al-Qaeda), having its counterterrorism strategy recognized as one of the most efficient worldwide.

Many of its effectiveness relates to the fact that the French system is in development since the 1980s, due to the necessity to counter terrorism in its own soil. France's main mechanisms to counter terrorism rely on the special relationship between its intelligence services and dedicated magistrates, as well as the judicial capacity to qualify acts of terrorism as autonomous offences, facilitating their punishment.

France counters terrorism in all its forms through the reinforcement of international cooperation – diplomatic and judiciary – with its partners in the UN, the European Union, the G8, and other regional organs. It widely condemns terrorist acts regardless of their motivations. The country works in order to diminish social and political hazards that incite

terrorism. However, as other countries, it also calls attention to the disrespect to human rights and human basic liberties when contending terrorism.

At the United Nations, despite its specific role at the UNSC, France works toward the reinforcement of the international jurisdictional norm, which is still incomplete when concerning terrorism and its definition.

The **Russian Federation** government's authority for fighting terrorism has been expanded in the last years, resulting in the foiling of a greater number of terrorist acts and the constant weakening of once powerful terrorist groups. The region of the country mostly affected by terrorist acts is the North Caucasus, where, according to the government, "the pacification of much of Chechnya has correlated with an increase in terrorism in Dagestan and Ingushetia" (USDS, 2007). The main governmental body established by the Russian Federation in order to coordinate the response to terrorism was created in 2006, and is best known as the National Antiterrorism Committee. Furthermore, at the St. Petersburg G8 Summit in July 2006, the Russian Federation has demonstrated a substantial effort to take a leading role in organizing a partnership among nations to hasten efforts to counter nuclear terrorism.

**Italy** has pursued an aggressive policy when addressing terrorism. The nation has "investigated and prosecuted terrorism suspects, dismantled terrorist-related cells within its borders and maintained high-level professional cooperation with its international partners" (USDS, 2007). Even though it is not a permanent member of the UNSC, the country has played a vigorous role in the UNSC Counterterrorism Committee and in UNSCR 1267 Committee deliberations, being a strong defender of multilateral cooperation in contending terrorism. Italy was also a leading financial contributor to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime Counterterrorism Prevention branch.

**Belgium** expressed its worry regarding the threat of terrorism through the creation of new institutions in its security services, the improvement of internal coordination among antiterrorism offices, the promulgation of aggressive laws to deal with terrorism and money laundering, and the support of agencies that confront terrorist financing. Many initiatives have been launched by the country at national and international levels to boost resources to combat terrorism effectively, such as the sharing of information with other countries. The Belgian government effectively dismantled terrorist cells inside its territory and, in order to share its knowledge, developed in its embassies centers to spread these achievements.

The **People's Republic of China's** actions against terrorism are of great importance in its region. After taking a leading role, alongside with Russia, in the foundation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China has made counterterrorism one of the organization's major aims. As the United Kingdom and the United States of America, China increased its efforts against terrorism financing and money laundering when it became a full member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2007. Chinese authorities claim that terrorists, mainly based in the Xinjiang province, persist in operating clandestinely on Chinese territory and have already boosted up the number of deployed security personnel in that region.

**Indonesia** strongly condemns terrorist acts in all their forms and stresses the importance of avoiding the identification of terrorism with any particular religion or ethnic group. In order to deter terrorism, the country is party in accordance to the idea of the construction of a legal foundation and further institutionalization that would protect not only the interests of the public but also human rights during the fight against terrorism.

In order to give way to such an organ, the country approved laws and regulations as well as became party to a wide range of relevant international legal instruments to counter terrorism. At the international level, Indonesia is currently a party to four UN Conventions concerning international terrorism and signatory to another two.

On the other hand, at the domestic level, the Indonesian National Police has achieved major successes in dismantling terrorist cells related to Jemaah Islamiya and other violent Islamic extremist organizations.

**Viet Nam** has been consistent in its condemnation of terrorist attacks in "whatever form, for whatever motive and by whomsoever", including those "committed with the pretext of defending democracy and human rights" (MINH, 2008). The country supports the strengthening of the fight against terrorism, always bearing in mind the "compliance with international law, particularly the principles of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of the States" (MINH, 2008).

In June 2006, the United States of America rescinded the **Libya Arab Jamahiriya's** designation as a State that sponsored terrorism. After renouncing terrorism, in 2003, the country produced substantial efforts to show commitment to the American "War on Terror". Since then, the U.S. Department of State alleges that "Libya has continued to cooperate closely with the international community on counterterrorism efforts."

**South Africa** defends a strategy that addresses not only the symptoms of terrorism, but also its causes, in order to ensure prevent its reoccurrence. In order to do so, the country is party to thirteen universal conventions on terrorism and has taken concrete steps to include the provisions of the conventions in national legislation. It also invited the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to conduct a country visit in June 2008, in order to verify its commitment to the fight against terrorism. Despite that, South Africa was the first country to be visited that agreed to the inclusion of a human rights expert in the CTC delegation.

**Burkina Faso**'s lack of necessary resources to protect its borders and to monitor the movement of terrorists poses an impending danger to the country and its capacity to assure its citizens' security. The country has widely condemned terrorist acts. Furthermore, due to its proximity to several countries where terrorist groups operate, and due to the porosity of its borders, there are serious concerns about the possibility of the country becoming a safe haven for terrorist organizations (USDS, 2007).

## 5. QUESTIONS TO PONDER

1. In the case of a major terrorist attack, considering its previous actions, how is the Security Council to react and what is to be its counterterrorism strategy?
2. Considering the importance of intelligence-sharing, on what level are member states contributing with each other on the matter?
3. What kind of measures will the Council enforce on states and organizations eventually involved with a terrorist attack?
4. What is the Security Council's long-term strategy to combating terrorism?
5. How to incorporate the knowledge of a terrorist organization's goals and strategies into the development of a counterstrategy?

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## **TOPIC AREA B: THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN**

By Ana Clara Backes Martins, Gustavo Frota Lima e Silva, Igor Isquierdo Celeste, Lucas Cé Sangalli and Thabita Fonseca Abraham

### **1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

#### **1.1 Formation of Afghanistan**

Throughout history, Afghanistan has been an important route between India and Europe, and, due to its location, suffered the invasion of several civilizations, such as the Persians, Macedonian Greeks, Arabs and Mongols. These series of invasions resulted in a complex ethnic, cultural and religious amalgam, and made important contributions to the building of the Afghan Nation.

In the late XIX century, the British and Russian empires sought to exert influence over Afghanistan. They found a territory that was mainly Islamic, hardly centralized in terms of politics, and of great ethnic diversity. In order to protect the “Jewel of the Crown”, the British invaded the Afghani territory twice<sup>29</sup>, establishing the country as part of their sphere of influence, since, because of its central location, Afghanistan constituted a buffer state between Tsarist Russia and British India. In 1919, Afghanistan achieved full formal independence from Britain.

Afghanistan enjoyed its longest period of stability under the rule of a pashtun King, Zahir Shah, between 1933 and 1973, but with the problem of famine mounting with no clear governmental reaction, the king fell to a coup staged by his own cousin, Muhammad Daud. The coup was allegedly an attempt to establish a republican regime, but proved incapable of gaining legitimacy. In fact, its advent “marked the disappearance not just of a king, but of a mechanical system more generally, which offered at least the semblance of a rule for peaceful succession to political authority” (MALLEY, 2002).

#### **1.2. Soviet-Afghan war**

After Daud’s overthrow, a communist regime was installed. The new government was unable to control the Afghan territory as a whole, and an increasing number of uprisings against the central government along the territory of Afghanistan drew the attention of the

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<sup>29</sup> There were three Anglo-Afghan Wars: 1839-42; 1878-80; 1919

Soviet Union. A series of strikes and counter-strikes within the ruling communist regime in Afghanistan with those masses and tribal leaders opened the way for a USSR intervention, as requested by the government of Afghanistan. On December 24, 1979, 100,000 Soviet soldiers entered Afghanistan, and started what would be known as the Soviet-Afghan War; the Soviet war on Afghanistan or simply the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

For ten years, the Soviets struggled with the organized resistance, composed by several groups of tribal and ethnic leaders – known as the Mujahedin<sup>30</sup>. The Mujahedin often used Islam as the reason for their resistance, attracting a large number of foreign fighters from other Islamic countries that were willing to take part in the conflict, especially Pakistan, which provided assistance to the Mujahedin and hosted many Afghani refugees. Unfortunately, that attracted a large number of religious extremists that saw in the Soviet-Afghan war their chance to start a struggle against unbelievers. Later on, many of these “jihadists”<sup>31</sup>, who became known as Arab-Afghans, founded or joined fundamentalist organizations – Osama Bin Laden being the most famous of them (RASHID, 2002).

The war disrupted Afghanistan’s previous social order, leaving hundreds of thousands dead or gravely injured and millions of refugees<sup>32</sup>. A whole generation of working age men was killed, and fighting became one of the most common activities for those who grew up during the war. Afghan women also had their lives widely disrupted, since many were abused, several became early widows, and all lost many of their liberties during the post-war period (RASHID, 2002).The economic consequences were also of great impact. The first of them was the destruction of Afghanistan’s main economic activity, agriculture: most arable areas, and the infrastructure attached to them, were either bombed or heavily mined, making it impossible for them to be cultivated. As both sides of the war had largely used land mines, some areas became unreachable and, therefore, economically irrelevant.

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<sup>30</sup> The word Mujahedin is the plural for Mujahed, which in Arabic means a Muslim involved in a *jihad* . In Afghanistan it has been used by the commanders of the resistance against the USSR to address their soldiers and themselves. The name was kept after the end of the war against the Soviet Union by the several warlords who dominated the country. The word *jihad* has a deep religious meaning, signifying the struggle of a Muslim to follow the path of Allah, improving oneself and one’s society. Recently *jihad* has been used by some extremists to describe their struggle against so-called unbelievers. This relatively new meaning has now been largely used to designate extremists and fundamentalists who defend the use of force against non-Islamists and their societies.

<sup>31</sup> The meaning of jihad is explained in the aforementioned reference (reference 2)

<sup>32</sup> According to Malley, 2002, between 1978 and 1987, unnatural deaths in Afghanistan amounted 876,825, there being over 60 Afghan deaths for each Soviet killed. The same author, quoting the World Health Organization, stipulates that over 1.5 million people were physically disabled by the war. The author complements this information with the data of over 6 million Afghan refugees outside the country in the beginning of the 1990’s. See Malley, 2002, pg154.

As an outcome of the Soviet-Afghan war, the state's capacity was severely damaged. Political institutions were underrated and Afghan elites were reconfigured by the war. Along with this process, Afghanistan's ethnic organization was considerably altered, with ethnic groups with no association to the Pashtuns increasing their political participation (MALLEY, 2002)<sup>33</sup>.

The constant interference of other countries in the region, even after the Soviet withdrawal, is also one of the main consequences of the Afghan-Soviet War. It has been stated that external influence was so damaging to Afghanistan that it "destroyed the traditional balance which guaranteed peace and relative stability" (LEVESQUE, 1990). The composition of that balance was so fragile that, once disrupted, the simple withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghan soil was not enough to restore it, even if some of its components did resurface. An international effort to rebuild Afghanistan would have been necessary; since it did not take place, the country fell victim to more violence and disputes.

### 1.3. The Civil War Years- 1989 -1996

With the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, Afghanistan was immersed in an intense civil war that lasted until 1992 (MALLEY, 2002). The Mujahedins attacked the Soviet-installed government of president Najibulah. After a series of battles across the country, and mainly around the capital city of Kabul, together with the fall the Soviet Union<sup>34</sup>, in 1991, the Najibulah government collapsed.

The country plunged into another type of civil war, one of lesser intensity overall, but with particularly harsh combats in some regions. During the civil war period, the country became a safe haven for religious extremist groups such as the Al-Qaida<sup>35</sup> and, with no type of control in most of the country's territories, these organizations could operate freely, as long as they supported the local Mujahed.

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<sup>33</sup> No fact can translate in a more eloquent manner the effects of war in Afghanistan's physiognomy than the changes it imposed to the repartition between urban and rural populations. In 1978 Afghanistan counted only 5 cities of over 100,000 inhabitants. Kabul, with no more than 700,000, was the largest one. By then cities accounted for 15% of the population, and rural areas, for 85%. After ten years of war, the rural population has fallen back to 25% of the population, while cities now show more than 75%. These numbers show much about the ruin of the agriculture, the countryside, and the environment. (LEVESQUE, 1990)

<sup>34</sup> The Soviet Union was the main supporter of President Najibulah.

<sup>35</sup> The Al-Qaida consists of an international alliance of Sunni Islamic militants that has as its main objectives the end, mostly through violent means, of foreign influence over Muslim countries and the creation of a new Islamic caliphate. It has attacked civilian and military targets in various countries, the most notable being the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. Due to its secrecy and structure of semi-autonomous cells, Al-Qaida's size and degree of responsibility for particular attacks are difficult to establish.

The city of Kabul was the main object of dispute from 1992 onwards. The Rabbani's<sup>36</sup> government's most fierce contestant, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a pashtun Sunni allegedly supported by Pakistan, was responsible for the bombing of Kabul, which weakened Rabbani's government. However, as the dispute between the two sides was slowly transforming into peaceful conversations, another actor emerged from Kandahar, posing a serious threat to the maintenance of the current regime. Taliban<sup>37</sup> forces literally removed Rabbani from power in late September 1996, dominating the country's key political symbol: the capital city.

#### 1.4. The Taliban Years

The Taliban Movement began in 1994, only two years before their taking of Kabul. Its initial aim was to free Afghanistan from conflict, installing a fundamentalist regime in accordance with their interpretation of Islam. It was deeply influenced by most members' links to Pakistan, allegedly with some of that country's governmental agencies playing an important role in supporting the Taliban in an attempt to determine the outcome of the civil war in the mid 1990s.

The movement has its origin in the Southern city of Kandahar, where the Pashtun majority, as well as the rest of the population, suffered with the consequences of the civil war and with the rule of local warlords<sup>38</sup>. When the Taliban came into power in Kandahar, relative peace and security was installed as warring tribal groups were crushed, the population disarmed, and the existent trade with other countries reestablished. The peaceful period did not last, as the Taliban spread their activity throughout the country, imposing their ideas by any means necessary.

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<sup>36</sup> Burhanuddin Rabbani was the president of Afghanistan from 1992 to 1996, when the country was known as the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

<sup>37</sup> The word Taliban derives from *talib* which means "student of Islam". This word was employed by the insurgents themselves to highlight the importance the Koran schools, the Madrassas, had to most Taliban (RASHID, 2002).

<sup>38</sup> Warlordism can be understood through the definition given by Marten, 2007, as a phenomenon with four major characteristics:

*"First, trained, armed men take advantage of the disintegration of central authority to seize control over relatively small slices of territory. Second, their actions are based on self-interest, not ideology. Third, their authority is based on charisma and patronage ties to their followers. Fourth, this personalistic rule leads to the fragmentation of political and economic arrangements across the country, disrupting the free flow of trade and making commerce and investment unpredictable. (MARTEN, 2007)*

Most Taliban militants were undereducated madrassa<sup>39</sup> students – hence the name of Taliban – or ex-refugees in Pakistan. Their treatment of women became worldwide infamous for its severity, and the harshness of religious and individual repressiveness had no parallel in Afghan history. To name a few of the orders and restrictions by Taliban leaders: girls’ schools were closed, universities were shut down, women were prohibited to work and had to be completely covered by veils, men were obliged to wear beards, people were not allowed to listen to music, fly kites, cut their hair, have their portraits taken or any kind of portrait shown<sup>40</sup> (RASHID, 2002).

Not only were the ideals of the Taliban in contrast with those of most Afghans, but their ethnic and religious composition was also unrepresentative of the country’s complexities. Mostly composed of Sunni pashtuns, the Taliban had typically no concern regarding other groups. They were reportedly anti-Shia and against all non-Pashtun groups, especially the Hazaras<sup>41</sup>. “The Taliban have given Islamic fundamentalism a new identity for the next millennium – one that refuses to accept any compromise or political system except their own” (RASHID, 2002).

The Taliban domination of Afghanistan was quick, having started with control over most of the south by the end of 1995, and ending with almost complete control over the mainly non-Pashtun Northern provinces – 90% of the country’s whole territory (CREWS & TARZI, 2008). Even though they never ceased to face opposition, by 1998 they dominated the vast majority of Afghanistan’s territory using several repressive means.

Besides its abovementioned repressiveness, the regime gained its international reputation of violence for another characteristic: the ruthless treatment of those they considered their enemies. The most representative act of this aspect were the events of 1998 in the Northeastern city of Mazar-e-Sharif, when four thousand people were killed by Taliban militants, in what was considered a revengeful act against Hazara resistance (CREWS & TARZI, 2008).

The proliferation of international terrorist networks in territories controlled by the Taliban was another important fact that characterized the regime. As long as they could profit

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<sup>39</sup> Madrassas are religious Islamic schools, where two kinds of formation are usually offered: the hâfiz and the âlim. Their curricular base is formed by Khoran interpretation lessons, Arab language; interpretation of the charia, hadith; mantiq and the history of Islam.

<sup>40</sup> For a complete survey of Taliban restrictions, see Rashid, 2002, appendix 1.

<sup>41</sup> The Hazaras are a Persian-speaking ethnic group that resides majorly in Pakistan and Afghanistan. They are Sunny Muslims and represent 9% of Afghanistan’s population, being the country’s largest ethnic group.

from it, the Taliban offered no constraints to the presence of those organizations in the country. The most known example is the one of Al-Qaida, whose leader, Osama Bin Laden, increasingly exercised influence within the Taliban regime and over its leader, Mullah Omar, the self-proclaimed Emir of Afghanistan, the “commander of the faithful”.

As Bin Laden and other members of the Al-Qaida had their role increased within the regime, the Taliban’s political position, which initially was mostly directed inwards, became increasingly anti-western and “jihadist” (MALLEY, 2002). After 1998, with the bombing by Al-Qaida of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and with information of Bin Laden being hidden in Afghan territory, relations with the West deteriorated, and the Taliban regime faced sanctions imposed by the UNSC. Those sanctions, however, failed to reach their goals and both the Taliban and the terrorist organizations they protected continued to act freely.

In 2001, Afghanistan was considered the country with the worst humanitarian conditions, since the Taliban increased its oppression against the population and as famine raided the country alongside with the conflicts. A symbol of this oppression was the destruction of two giant historical statues of Buddha from the Hellenistic period. Fighting between the Northern Resistance – which was the main opposition force against Taliban – and the Taliban itself intensified, culminating in the death of its main leader just days before September 11.

### **1.5. Post Taliban Regime**

Following the attacks September 11, 2001 to the United States, a US-led campaign began against the Taliban regime and the Al-Qaida terrorist network it was allegedly sheltering (CREWS; TARZI, 2008). The campaign, named Operation Enduring Freedom, started on October 7 and sought to overthrow the Taliban, following the regime’s refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden (INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, 2007). Operation Enduring Freedom initially relied on aerial bombing and missile attacks from American and British surface ships and submarines located in the Arabian Sea.

As the offensive grew, it pursued to support internal opposition forces, namely the National Islamic United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, popularly referred to as the Northern Alliance. On November 9, Mazar-e Sharif, the largest city of northern Afghanistan, fell to forces that were ostensibly part of the Northern Alliance. Following that defeat, the Taliban evacuated Kabul without a fight on November 13.

In the beginning of the following month, Mullah Omar issued the order to surrender Kandahar, his regime’s last stronghold, as this decision was the only one that could prevent the city from being forcefully conquered and possibly devastated. Through this order, Omar effectively relinquished all political power in Afghanistan. On that day, December 6, the Taliban cabinet met in Kandahar and decided that the regime would transfer power to the tribal council headed by Hamid Karzai. They also declared that their forces would surrender weapons to the same council (CREWS; TARZI, 2008).

Assuming control of the Interim Authority of Afghanistan on December 22, as established by the Bonn Agreement<sup>42</sup>, Karzai declared amnesty to the Taliban forces, applied only to “non-criminal” elements of the former regime. However, as those elements were not specified, the amnesty was broadly implemented, leading to the escape of important Taliban leaders, who managed to either flee to Pakistan or hide within the mountainous areas of Afghanistan.

Other foreign peacekeeping troops, besides those related to Operation Enduring Freedom, arrived in the country in the beginning of 2002, as a part of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)<sup>43</sup>. The ISAF – currently under NATO’s auspices - is a military mission established by the United Nations in December 2001 which initially sought to guarantee the security of Kabul and to consolidate the Afghan Transitional Administration. By December of that year, a number of violent incidents began to take place in the country, especially in the mountainous border areas of eastern and south-eastern Afghanistan. Those attacks were attributed to remnant Al-Qaida and Taliban members, installed both in Southern-Afghan and Pakistani territory.

In the following years, the build-up in Taliban activity continued. Strongholds were established in many southern provinces of the country, as the Taliban virtually eliminated government influence in the south. This weakness of the Afghan state is partly explained by the failed reconciliation policy it implemented. As the government sought to include representatives of all ethnic groups in the political sphere, people from all sides began openly criticizing and even threatening Karzai. Non-Pashtuns accused him of being soft on the

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<sup>42</sup> The Bonn agreement inaugurated the Afghan Interim Authority on December 22. It was agreed that it should have a six-month mandate to be followed by a two year Transitional Authority. After that period, elections were to be held.

<sup>43</sup> The ISAF (currently under NATO’s auspices) is a military mission established by the United Nations in December 2001 which initially sought to guarantee the security of Kabul and to consolidate the Afghan Transitional Administration.

Taliban and of lacking legitimacy to rule the country, whereas the Pashtuns were unhappy because they felt he was pandering to the powerful Tajiks of the United Front. Even after Karzai was democratically elected in October 9, 2004, with 55.4% of all votes, three times more votes than any other candidate, the government lacked endorsement among a considerable portion of the Afghan population.

The efforts by ISAF and by the Afghan military forces have not been sufficiently effective to contain rebellion and the mounting Taliban insurgency in the areas outside of Kabul. As the end of 2006 approached, NATO sources estimated that the areas affected by the insurgency had more than quadrupled in that year. Moreover, the military activities of the insurgents, which included suicide attacks, as well as direct and indirect fire attacks, had also increased dramatically (GIUSTOZZI, 2008).

The situation in the country is still very unstable, as the Taliban and the drug economy represent fundamental threats to the still-fragile political, economic and social institutions. The anti-Government elements are far from defeated. Most districts in the east, south-east and south remain largely inaccessible to Afghan officials and aid-workers, making it virtually impossible to impose national unity (S/2008/159).

## **2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE**

### **2.1. Security Overview**

Seven years after the overthrow of the Taliban regime, and two years after the Afghanistan Compact<sup>44</sup>, the country remains in a difficult situation. Taliban insurgents and sympathizers continue to obstruct the way to reconstruction, being one of the most important factors in the delayed political, economic and social stabilization of the country (S/2008/159). The Taliban are largely financed by narcotics production which, despite predictions of a slight downturn for 2008 (UNODC, 2008), is still responsible for a large part of the Afghan economy and is closely linked to the especially poor security conditions in some regions (UNODC, 2008). Besides the Taliban insurgency and narcotics production, the government faces two other major challenges: the lack of resources to pursue the structural reforms and

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<sup>444</sup> The Afghanistan Compact, which will be further detailed in the “Previous International Action” section of this guide, was an effort made in 2006 by the Afghan government, the United Nations and the International Community, to establish feasible relatively short-term goals for the reconstruction and nation building of Afghanistan. The document, which presents the plans and schedules for the goals, can be found in: [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan\\_compact.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf).

the institutionalization necessary for its stability; as well as the internal obstacle of high corruption reportedly present in some governmental organs (RUBIN, 2007).

In 2007, a marked increase in anti-government and terrorist activities was observed in comparison with 2006, with a monthly average of 566 incidents being recorded in that year, as opposed to 425 in 2006 (S/2008/159). Furthermore, over 8,000 conflict related casualties were reported along the year, among them 1,500 civilians (S/2008/159). Another source of concern has been the repeated attacks against aid workers and aid convoys. In 2007, “in over 130 attacks against humanitarian programmes, 40 humanitarian workers were killed and 89 abducted, of whom seven were later killed by their captors” (S/2008/159).

In terms of the geographical reality of the conflict, the country is approximately divided between the relatively stable north and the west, where violence issues are generally connected to factionalism, that is, the internal divisions within the ruling powers, and criminality (S/2008/159); and the south and the east, where an anti-government insurgency is growingly coordinated. Even in the south, where insurgency has traditionally been linked to, the conflict has been concentrated in small areas, which are hardly accessible to the government and international forces.

The international operation in Afghanistan remains extremely hard as UN agencies, for example, are unable to access some 78 districts in the south (S/2008/159). Missions are often spoiled by harsh weather and infrastructure conditions, being forcefully suspended for isolated areas during the winter months. Other difficulties faced by international aid workers are economically motivated crimes, when individuals with no direct connections to the insurgency attack supply and material convoys.

Some progress has been achieved in solving these problems, especially in the present year: national and international military forces have achieved important tactical successes (S/2008/159); the government has identified the importance of improving sub-national governments and has established that as one of its priorities; preparation for the 2009/2010 elections has begun; and “the international community agreed to provide increased, more predictable, transparent and accountable assistance” to the country (Declaration of the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan, 2008). Plenty, however, has yet to be done, and the security and political situations are still of great concern.

## 2.2. Governance<sup>45</sup>

The present year is a crucial one in the future of Afghanistan. Since presidential elections are to be held in 2009, it is president Karzai's last full calendar year in office and his government will be watched closely by the population. "The efficacy of Karzai's strategy will be under scrutiny like never before, and although he may not need to face the Afghan electorate again until Spring 2009, his achievements in 2008 will set the country's future course" (SENLIS COUNCIL WEBSITE, 2008<sup>46</sup>). Since the act of voting itself may be dangerous in the regions where anti-government insurgents are strongly based, the government will have the task of diminishing the insurgents' influence over the population and of guarding it from potential threats, guaranteeing the security of the electoral process during both the registry of the voters and the voting itself.

For the security of the population and of the electoral process to be improved, the government's focus will be on improving the sub-national and provincial security situation, thus gaining both legitimacy and support. The challenge is greater in the southern and eastern regions, where insurgency tends to be stronger. For the situation in those regions and in the country as a whole to improve, the government will have to tackle the complex governance context.

"The governance context in Afghanistan is an inter-related complex of features relating to its condition as a 'post-conflict state' experiencing continued conflict, the prevalence of poverty and vulnerability, and regional illicit and war economies, the functional weakness of its state structures and penetrability of its borders, and long-standing fragmentation of power at the sub-national level, exacerbated by the effects of recent conflicts" (NIXON, 2008).

Even though the importance of sub-national governance has long been recognized by the Government and the International Community as a prerequisite for national development, stability and security, Afghanistan lacks a clear "sub-national governance framework that coherently connect[s] resources, responsibilities and accountability" (NIXON, 2008). One

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<sup>45</sup> Governance will be utilized here in the sense used by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit: "governance concerns ways of organizing resources and responsibilities toward collective ends" (NIXON, 2008). Another interesting definition is given by T. Plumptre in the Institute for Governance's website: "governance is the process whereby societies or organizations make important decisions, determine whom they involve and how they render account." <http://www.iog.ca/page.asp?pageID=3&htmlarea=home>, last accessed 22<sup>nd</sup> of August, 2008.

<sup>46</sup> The Senlis Council is an international policy think tank which operates from Southern Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq, as their Conflict Zone Research Platforms. For more information, visit [www.senliscouncil.net](http://www.senliscouncil.net)

important step toward a coherently formulated policy is the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), which was established by the Government in mid-2007 with the mission of supervising provincial governors, district administrators and municipalities and of providing the Provincial Councils with support (S/2008/159).

It will thus act to connect the government to communities across the country, trying to improve the performance of provincial development committees. Another feature of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance is its role in counter-narcotics, since it will also evaluate provincial governors on their performance in that matter. If enough resources are applied and it is effectively controlled, the IDLG can be an important instrument for the government's legitimacy and for the fight against corruption.

The corruption problem has been recognized by the government as being of great concern, and it has taken important steps in addressing the issue. Several corruption assessments were made by government officials and a draft national anti-corruption strategy has been developed. Nevertheless, "additional clarity is required on the roles of the various bodies established to deal with corruption" (S/2008/159).

Two government organs often linked with corruption and inefficiency have been the Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for the Afghan National Police (ANP), and the Judiciary, both of which :

"are deeply corrupted and plagued by a lack of basic skills, equipment, and resources. Without effective and honest administrators, police, and judges, the state can do little to provide internal security – and if the government does not provide security, people will not recognize it as a government" (RUBIN, 2007).

That problem has been acknowledged by the government, which called on the reform of the Ministry and the ANP. The International Police Coordination Board is responsible for the coordination of "all international efforts to support the reform of the Ministry of the Interior and ANP, to develop an overarching reform strategy for the police, balancing the needs of law enforcement and counter-insurgency" (S/2008/159).

As for the Ministry of Justice, its capacities are limited as it is "overburdened by the amount of legislation awaiting drafting, scrutiny and overview" (S/2008/159). A National Justice Programme, as well as a national justice sector strategy were drafted in the Rome Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan in July 2007, with a "focus on strengthening

Afghan capacity to deliver legal services with integrity and accountability, ensure public access to courts and legal aid and improve public awareness of legal rights and processes, while promoting the coordination of donor activities” (S/2008/159). Despite these efforts, the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General’s Office continue to experience a “significant lack of resources, infrastructure, and qualified and experienced judges and prosecutors” (S/2008/159).

### **2.3. The Insurgency**

As in the political sphere, the next year will probably be critical for counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, with the developments of the upcoming months possibly representing a turning point towards the increase or decrease in Taliban power. Through last year, the insurgents gained power in the south, installing parallel governments in several districts and controlling the majority of the secondary roads (SENLIS COUNCIL WEBSITE, 2008). Developments in Pakistan are also to be crucial over the next period, as Taliban has continually gained forces in the northwest of that country.

To better understand the difficulties Afghanistan faces against Taliban, or neo-Taliban, insurgency, it is first necessary to fully characterize it, in terms of their ideologies, their location, their means of financing themselves, their strategy, and their support among the Afghan people.

Although today’s Taliban insurgents are largely inspired by the Taliban movement from the 1990’s, some important differences are perceptible. While the original Taliban regime was a coherent group, organized around strong leaders such as Mullah Omar, the so called neo-Taliban can be divided into at least two main ideological groups: one more radical, with close ties to al-Qaeda, and another more connected to traditional Pashtun tribes (TARZI, 2008). In opposition to the early Taliban, today’s insurgents count less on external financial and political support, and while the Taliban members were primarily attached to Afghan territory, the neo-Taliban insurgents are almost as present in north-western Pakistan as they are in southern Afghanistan. To describe the new insurgency, scholars have coined the term *neo-Taliban* to “recognize that this new phenomenon encompasses both the past and new agendas, players, and engagement strategies” (TARZI, 2008).

The relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan is crucial for the hindrance of the insurgency and, therefore, for the stability of the region (S/2008/159). It is acknowledged that the northwestern region of Pakistan, a tribal belt along the frontier with Afghanistan, has been

serving as a “haven for a core group of nationally and internationally networked terrorists, a training and recruiting ground for Afghan Taliban, and, increasingly, a hotbed of indigenous militancy that threatens the stability of Pakistan’s own State and society” (CFR, 2008). The Pakistani government has been trying to respond to that situation, but its efforts have proven to be repeatedly ineffective. Several scholars and observers have argued that an effective counter-insurgency policy for Afghanistan will have to take into account the role of Pakistan’s tribal areas (RUBIN, 2008) (RASHID, 2008).

Another important matter to be addressed when dealing with the insurgency is the role narcotics production plays in the financing of the neo-Taliban. It is said that the insurgents operate by protecting the opium and cannabis producers from the government’s and the international agencies’ eradication efforts, charging for their services 10% of the cultivators’ revenue. “The attempts of the Afghan Government and the International Community to rebuild state institutions, curb warlordism, and create a viable legal economy were heavily imperiled by the illicit cash generated by drug traffickers” (RASHID, 2008).

For farmers, poppy production is almost a matter of “prudent judgment” (RASHID, 2008), since it is one of the only crops to grow easily in the Afghan war-torn, little-irrigated fields, and since it is by far the most rewarding production in the country, especially if one takes into account the high level of poverty throughout Afghanistan. To oppose that trend, the government has been making ample counter-narcotics efforts, focusing especially on “the importance of alternative development, a province-centered approach and a strengthened donor support for the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund<sup>47</sup>” (S/2008/159). With the government’s and its international supporters’ struggle against drug production, the sharp increases in opium production observed in the past years have waned. Nevertheless, “the total amount of opium being harvested remains shockingly high” (UNODC, 2008).

As for the insurgency’s strategy, it can be said that it evolved from 2001 to 2008 in three main phases: the first one, which was extended until 2003, concentrated in infiltrating the population and gaining influence over it; the second one was of “consolidation of ‘base areas’, organized guerrilla warfare and the creation of political structures in safe areas” (GIUSTOZZI, 2008.), which took place from 2004 to 2006; from 2006 on, the insurgency started its “final offensive” – that year in Kandahar was “the first time [the neo-Taliban]

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<sup>47</sup> The Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund is part of the Prioritized Implementation Plan for the National Drug Control Strategy, which aims at the eradication of 50,000 hectares for 2008.

openly challenged the foreign contingents in a large battle” (GIUSTOZZI, 2008). Since that development, the security forces operating in Afghanistan have made significant responses against the insurgency, which has been continually challenging the government and ISAF troops, incorporating asymmetric conflict<sup>48</sup> tactics such as “suicide bombings, improvised explosive technology, and global communications strategies” (RUBIN, 2008).

The results of these strategies have been noticed throughout Afghanistan. Studies by the Senlis Council, an Afghan-based think tank, indicate that the Taliban have permanent presence in 54% of the Afghan territory (SENLIS COUNCIL WEBSITE, 2008). The same study points that “the Taliban are the de facto governing authority in significant portions of territory in the south and east”, making the counter-insurgency efforts increasingly complicated.

Most of the Taliban’s capacity of drawing support from the Afghan population is derived in their ability to use propaganda and media in their favor, making their forces appear greater than they actually are and their opponents, therefore, weaker. “Showing great ability to manipulate the press and their interlocutors” (GIUSTOZZI, 2008) by deliberately “leaking” information on their victories, calling journalists to visit supposed Taliban camps, and making scornful declarations against the government. In their propaganda impetus, the insurgents did not use only the press, but called on singers to make songs about their cause, and produced videos and recordings with explicit propaganda content (GIUSTOZZI, 2008), thus making themselves constantly present in Afghan lives.

Given the high complexity of the insurgency, counter-insurgency undertaking must take into account all of the different characteristics herein explained. Their ideology must be fought given that the Taliban today do not have a core thought guiding them. Their internal support must be addressed without forgetting that “the support of foreign-based networks in providing leadership, planning, training, funding and equipment clearly remains crucial to its viability” (S/2008/159). Narcotics production must be eradicated, but the importance it has in providing for Afghan households must be substituted. Finally, the strategy of the Taliban needs to be counteracted, rendering it harder for them to turn their attacks in their favor in terms of public support.

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<sup>48</sup> Asymmetric Conflict can be defined as “ a weaker adversary using unconventional means, stratagems, or niche capabilities to overcome a stronger power.” (JANDORA, 2005 apud GIUSTOZZI, 2008)

## 2.4. Operations Coordination

There are three main actors working in counter-insurgency and reconstruction in Afghanistan: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which operates mainly through ISAF, works in assisting the Afghan authorities on matters of security and stability, with aims to reconstruct governance<sup>49</sup>; the Afghan National Army, which has been trained over the last five years by coalition forces to become the major actor responsible for land-based military operations in the country; and UNAMA, the UN mission to Afghanistan, whose “overall function is to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan by leading efforts of the international community in conjunction with the Government of Afghanistan in rebuilding the country and strengthening the foundations of peace and constitutional democracy” (UNAMA WEBSITE, 2008)<sup>50</sup>. Each of these actors plays separately an important role in bringing peace to Afghanistan.

NATO’s focus in Afghanistan is on enhancing the security situation, thus creating the conditions necessary to the reconstruction and institutionalization efforts. The organization’s engagement in the country is three-fold<sup>51</sup>. Its core objective is to assist, through ISAF’s force of 52,700 troops, “the Afghan authorities in extending and exercising its authority and influence across the country, creating the conditions for stabilization and reconstruction.” The second aspect of NATO’s action is the presence of a “Senior Civilian Representative,” who works closely with ISAF and is “responsible for advancing the political-military aspects of the Alliance’s commitment to the country,” by articulating with the Afghan government, neighboring countries and other international organizations. The third aspect is NATO’s “substantial program of cooperation with Afghanistan, concentrating on defense reform, defense institution-building and the military aspects of security sector reform.

ISAF’s main operational obstructions lie mostly in contributing countries’ difficulties to coordinate among themselves and in dealing with public opinion issues<sup>52</sup>, with most troop-contributing countries presenting extensive lists of restrictions for their troops operation. Another issue is the reluctance among most members to employ their troops in the most insecure areas, such as the South.

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<sup>49</sup> Further information at <http://www.nato.int> Last accessed on September 2008.

<sup>50</sup> Further information at [www.unama-afg.org](http://www.unama-afg.org) Last accessed on September 2008.

<sup>51</sup> Further information at <http://www.nato.int> Last accessed on September 2008.

<sup>52</sup> Some countries, such as France, have been facing low public support to the presence of soldiers in Afghanistan, despite governmental policy. For more information on the French example, see: [http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=796681&story\\_id=12010407](http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=796681&story_id=12010407).

The 46,000-troop Afghan National Army (ANA), which started off in 2003 with only 1,750 troops, is becoming an important element in counter-insurgency and in the further legitimization of the Afghan Army, as observable in president Karzai's objective of increasing it to a force of 70,000 men by 2009<sup>53</sup>. The ANA has received extensive help and training from countries operating in Afghanistan, especially the US, and is fully recognized by the Afghan population as the legitimate force in the conflict. The ANA is operating intensively in the south, near the region of Kandahar, and, without restrictions regarding its mandate, soldiers appear to be highly motivated.

The ANA, however, still faces some important difficulties. One of the main ones is that, in contrast with the relatively high western aid budget for the Army, it counts with few western personnel to help with technology, planning and logistics. The other is the ethnic divisions within the Army, which sometimes represent the divisions present in Afghan society, despite efforts by the ANA to counter them.

As for UNAMA<sup>54</sup>, which coordinates all UN activities in Afghanistan, it is considered a political undertaking with the double mission of dealing with humanitarian and development issues and of handling political matters<sup>55</sup>. To face critics regarding the lack of cooperation among the different actors in the region, the Security Council determined the active role of UNAMA in enhancing that aspect by "leading the civilian efforts to promote more coherent support by the international community to the Afghan Government; strengthen cooperation with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); provide political outreach through a strengthened and expanded presence throughout the country; [and] provide good offices in support of Afghan-led reconciliation process" (UNAMA WEBSITE, 2008)<sup>56</sup>, among other issues.

### **3. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION**

#### **3.1. Actions before 2001**

The United Nations has been dealing with Afghan issues since 1980, when the General Assembly (GA) held an Emergency Special Session on Afghanistan from January 10 to 14,

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<sup>53</sup> Further information at [www.mod.gov.af/](http://www.mod.gov.af/) Last accessed on September 2008.

<sup>54</sup> Established on March 28, 2002, by UN resolution 1401.

<sup>55</sup> Further information at [www.unama-afg.org/about/overview.htm](http://www.unama-afg.org/about/overview.htm) Last accessed on September 2008.

<sup>56</sup> Further information at [www.unama-afg.org](http://www.unama-afg.org) Last accessed on September 2008.

1980. The GA adopted the first of a series of resolutions regarding the “Situation in Afghanistan” (Resolution ES-6/2), deploring the armed intervention in the country.

During the late 1990s, the UN Security Council, as well as the General Assembly, adopted a series of resolutions regarding the ongoing situation in Afghanistan, as the Taliban was growing in strength, destabilizing the country. On October 22, 1996, when the Taliban took Kabul, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1076 (S/RES/1076), stating its concern that the conflict provided ground for terrorism and drug trafficking.

Following the August 7, 1998, terrorist bomb attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Council adopted Resolution 1193 (S/RES/1193), which repeated its concern at the continuing presence of terrorists in the territory of Afghanistan. Moreover, on December 8, by the adoption of Resolution 1214 (S/RES/1214), the Security Council demanded the Taliban to stop providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organizations, and all Afghan factions to cooperate in bringing indicted terrorists to justice.

As of the failure of the Taliban to respond to this demand, in 1999 the UNSC applied broad sanctions to the country under the enforcement provisions of the United Nations Charter. The sanctions, imposed on November 14, included the freezing by states of all funds and other financial resources owned or controlled by the Taliban.

### **3.2. Post 2001 actions**

Since the beginning of the military procedures in Afghanistan, there have been two main military interventions in the country. Both have sought to stabilize the situation within Afghan borders and to guarantee that no further terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda would take place. Operation Enduring Freedom acted primarily in the eastern and southern parts of the country, along the Pakistani border. It is important to emphasize that OEF is not a NATO operation, although some coalition partners are NATO members.

The United Nations Security Council did not authorize the actions of OEF in Afghanistan, although it has been argued that authorization was not required, as the invasion may be considered an act of collective self-defense provided for under article 51 of the UN Charter. On the other hand, the UNSC did authorize the creation of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with authority to take all measures necessary to fulfill its mandate of assisting the Afghan Interim Authority in maintaining security. The two operations run parallel to one another at the present time.

ISAF was established on December 20, 2001 by the UNSC. In 2003, the Council authorized the expansion of the ISAF mission throughout Afghanistan, as NATO troops began engaging in more extensive combat operations in the country, especially in the Pakistani border regions. The ISAF's mandate does not include a pro-active role in fighting the illegal opium economy in Afghanistan. However, it plays an indirect role in sharing intelligence with the Afghan government, protecting Afghan poppy crop eradication units, and helping to coordinate and implement the country's counter narcotics policy.

The United Nations itself has tackled the issue on Afghanistan through the action of UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), a political mission directed and supported by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. UNAMA was established on March 28, 2002, by UNSC Resolution 1401 (S/RES/1401). The mission deals both with humanitarian and political issues, as defined by Resolutions 1662 (S/RES/1662 - 2006) and 1746 (S/RES/1746 - 2007). UNAMA's priorities include strengthening Afghan institutions and building the capacity of the Afghan Administration at all levels.

In order to achieve the stated goals, all missions' actions aim at cooperation among the UN, the Afghan government and the international community. The framework for such cooperation is outlined by the Afghanistan Compact, a blueprint for working towards peace and security, rule of law, good governance, human rights protection and sustainable economic and social development over a five-year period. The Compact was launched on January 31, 2006, at the London Conference on Afghanistan, as a result of consultations between the government of Afghanistan, the United Nations and the international community. The compact followed the formal conclusion of the Bonn Process which had launched the reconstruction process in 2001 and reached its goal in the parliamentary and provincial elections in 2005. It serves as a basis for the next stage of reconstruction, which is to rely more strongly on the country's own institutions.

On March 20, 2008, the UNSC extended the mandate of United Nations Mission in Afghanistan for one more year, until March 2009, through its Resolution 1806 (S/RES/1806). Moreover, the Conference in Support of Afghanistan held in Paris last June (Paris Conference) resulted in pledges of international assistance totaling approximately US\$ 20 billion. In addition to that, the Paris Declaration reaffirmed that the Afghanistan Compact remains the basis for the common effort between the international community and the government of Afghanistan.

The Conference in Support of Afghanistan also marked the launch of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), a roadmap for joint action over the next five years. Based on the Afghanistan Compact, ANDS covers three broad areas: security; governance, rule of law and human rights; and economic and social development (Declaration of The International Conference in Support of Afghanistan – 2008).

One of the priorities of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy is the establishment of stronger institutions in order to ensure that the progress achieved in the country is sustained and that the trust in the government is increased by improving public administration, local governance, justice, police and other law enforcement institutions. Efforts regarding institution-building have so far been insufficient and fragmented.

Regarding economic development, the National Development Strategy stresses the importance of stimulating investments in infrastructure, especially in the agriculture and energy sectors. The goal is to allow Afghanistan to move gradually out of a situation of aid dependency. A further priority is support for private sector development.

Humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan is also of crucial importance for the country development. In 2008, factors such as natural disasters, food insecurity and ongoing conflict have deepened the vulnerability of populations and increased the humanitarian caseload. Food insecurity in particular has been exacerbated by the global rise in food prices and has the potential to undermine growth and stability, in addition to causing widespread malnourishment. “In all likelihood Afghanistan will be faced with a worsening food situation in the coming months” (S/2008/434).

On July 3, the United Nations Secretary General issued a report (S/2008/434) stating that, while the main objectives of UNAMA (stated in UNSC Resolution 1806 – 2008) should remain unchanged, some specific areas require a greater deal of attention at this moment. UNAMA must aim to lead and coordinate its international partners to ensure support to Afghan authorities in the electoral process of 2009/10 and, in particular, to the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission. The United Nations Development Program is already implementing a project which is designed to build the capacity of the Electoral Commission and provide necessary technical assistance.

Apart from guaranteeing the forthcoming elections, the Secretary General stated that UNAMA must guide and promote the support to the Afghan National Development Strategy, as well as deal with the problem of production and trafficking of narcotics in Afghanistan. UNAMA, through the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, will coordinate practical

assistance from the international community and provide technical advice to support the government's anti-narcotics strategy. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind the importance of the adoption by the Security Council on June 11, 2008 of Resolution 1817 (S/RES/1817), which calls for strengthened international cooperation against the illegal use of chemical precursors<sup>57</sup>.

#### 4. BLOC POSITIONS

**China's** main priorities concerning Afghanistan are security and stability. Another important aspect is the need for accelerating economic development and social reconstruction, both of which are key to restoring peace and security. Drug trafficking and opium planting should also be approached severely and in an integrated manner. Finally, China stresses the need for the international community to honor its commitments and continue to support the Afghan Government and people<sup>58</sup>. Furthermore, China provided in 2007 an additional 80 million RMB yuan to Afghanistan this year.

**France's** approach to Afghanistan in 2008 is mainly that of the European Union, especially since it currently holds the presidency of that institution. Being so, it stresses the points established in the Paris Declaration and focuses on some specific points. Firstly it favors the "strengthening of democracy through competent, transparent and representative Afghan institutions,"<sup>59</sup> underlying the importance of preparation for the elections to be held in 2009 and 2010. France also supports all the efforts by the international community towards the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the "Afghanistan Compact." Another grave concern for the French is the importance of strengthening security, so that all other objectives can be reached. Lastly, France is one of the top contributing countries to ISAF: its troops were increased in April this year from 1,900 to 2,660<sup>60</sup>. France lost 10 of its soldiers in the outskirts of Kabul, in August this year, the largest loss by the French military in 25 years (AFP, 2008).

The **Russian Federation's** main worries regarding Afghanistan are the development of terrorist activities and the growing presence of the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremists on Afghan soil. Russia believes that UNAMA's main objective should be guaranteeing the

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<sup>57</sup> Substances that may be used for the manufacture of narcotic drugs and other psychotropic materials.

<sup>58</sup> Further information at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn> Last accessed on September 2008.

<sup>59</sup> Further information at [www.franceonu.org](http://www.franceonu.org), last accessed on September 2008

<sup>60</sup> Further information at [http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf\\_placemat.pdf](http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf) , last accessed on September 2008

full respect for anti-Taliban sanctions regime, especially regarding the maintenance of extremists and of those guilty of criminal crimes away – distant from a return to normal civilian life.<sup>61</sup> Another major focus should be on cutting the sources of “terrorist subversion,”<sup>62</sup> especially those originated in drug trafficking. Finally, the Russian Federation actively participates in implementing projects of vital significance for Afghanistan in the areas of energy, transport and mineral processing.

In December 2007, the Prime Minister of the **United Kingdom** launched a new Afghanistan Strategy, which was to be a long-term and “comprehensive” framework for security, political, social and economic development for Afghanistan.<sup>63</sup> That framework focuses on four major points: firstly is the building of Afghan ownership; secondly, the solidification of the democratic constitution by the development and strengthening of state institutions on provincial and local, as well as national, levels; the third point is reconstruction and the fourth is the need for concert among all actors in Afghanistan, which should shift together their emphasis from “short term stabilization to long term development”. Finally, as the second main contributor to the ISAF, the United Kingdom currently disposes of 8,380 troops in Afghanistan<sup>64</sup>.

The **United States**, with 31,000<sup>65</sup> troops presently in Afghan territory, 17,790 with ISAF<sup>66</sup>, and the remaining with operation Enduring Freedom, is currently the country with the most troops in ISAF and has been acting to reach a greater commitment from its partners in Afghanistan. The US also aims at reviewing the UN mandate, with a deeper focus on coordination of the civilian effort, increasing UNAMA’s mandate in that direction.<sup>67</sup> Also regarding the UN mandate, the US stresses the importance of the organization in sustaining international support for Afghanistan. The American position has also been leaning towards the increase of civilian participation in Afghanistan, with better coordination between civilians and the military, as well as a more responsible attitude from its neighbors.

**Burkina Faso** has been optimistic regarding the outsets of the Paris Conference and the taking on of greater responsibility by the Afghan Government. Burkina Faso also deems

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<sup>61</sup> Further information at <http://www.un.int/russia>, last accessed on September 2008

<sup>62</sup> Further information at <http://www.un.int/russia>, last accessed on September 2008

<sup>63</sup> Further information at <http://www.number10.gov.uk>, last accessed on September 2008

<sup>64</sup> Further information at [http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf\\_placemat.pdf](http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf), last accessed on September 2008

<sup>65</sup> Further information at [www.defenselink.mi](http://www.defenselink.mi), last accessed on September 2008

<sup>66</sup> Further information at [http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf\\_placemat.pdf](http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf), last accessed on September 2008

<sup>67</sup> Further information at [www.accessmylibrary.com](http://www.accessmylibrary.com), last accessed on September 2008

of great importance the Government's plan to hold a dialog with civil society and marginalized groups. Finally, for the African country, one of the main roles in resolving the Afghan conflict is that of the neighboring countries, which should help the government with its stabilization policy (SC/9392).

**Libya** stresses the importance of respecting the human rights of Afghan civilians and urges the ISAF and other forces to do so (SC/9392, 2008). The recent deterioration in the security situation in Afghanistan, as well as its implications to the Muslim world, is also a matter of concern for Libyan authorities. The country also recalls the importance of national reconciliation and of free and fair elections.

**South Africa's** main worries concerning Afghanistan are increased Taliban and Al-Qaida insurgency, illegal drug production and trafficking, endemic corruption and the weakness of state institutions. For South Africa, the international community must keep its support to Afghanistan, remaining firm in its compromises (SC/9392, 2008).

Regarding the situation in Afghanistan, **Belgium's** position is focused on seven main points to be pursued in the current reconstruction and pacification effort. These points are: the search for closer relations between ISAF and the Afghan armed forces (ANA) and for the increase of the ANA size; the creation and maintenance of a good functioning police and judiciary system; the need for the reconstruction and development efforts to reach rural areas; the need for better coordination between all actors, both in the international arena and in the field; the necessity of both redoubled efforts against drugs and the rethinking of the current strategies on that matter; the increase in the Afghan government's responsibility for stability and development of the country; and the imperative of a better disposition from Afghanistan's neighbors in contributing to the stabilization of the region through Afghanistan.<sup>68</sup> Also of primary importance is the current deployment of 390 Belgian troops in the ISAF<sup>69</sup>.

The strategies outlined at the Paris Conference have been widely supported by **Croatia**. For that country, one of the main focuses of the international community when dealing with Afghanistan should be the threats posed by criminal activities, especially those related with drug trafficking, and the paths to efficiently combat these activities (SC/9392, 2008). Furthermore, the international community should permanently back the National

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<sup>68</sup> Further information at [www.diplomatie.be](http://www.diplomatie.be), last accessed on September 2008

<sup>69</sup> Further information at [http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf\\_placemat.pdf](http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf), last accessed on September 2008

Development Strategy, being guided and coordinated by UNAMA, providing it with the required resources.

**Italy** is among the top five contributors to the ISAF, with currently 2,350 troops on Afghan soil<sup>70</sup>. Its position regarding Afghanistan is fully aligned with that of the European Union, as expressed by the French representative.<sup>71</sup> Italy has recently stepped up further its long-standing commitment through new financial pledges as well as additional assets and enhanced flexibility for its troops.

For **Costa Rica**, protection of human rights, restoration of peace and stability, and social and economic development are the main priorities in Afghanistan. Drug trafficking, as well as poppy production, are also key issues to be tackled, focusing on the economic alternatives to drug production (SC/9392, 2008). UNAMA, according to Costa Rica, has a very important role in establishing stability and security in Afghanistan.

**Panama** believes the lack of coordination among the several actors working in Afghanistan's nation building to be one of the central problems in the reconstruction effort, posing a serious threat to multilateralism (S/PV.5851, 2008). The Central American country also defends an increase in UNAMA's leadership capacity, underlying the mission's importance in bringing cohesion to the actions taken in the restructuring of Afghanistan.

In **Indonesia's** point of view, the security situation in Afghanistan is a matter that should be dealt with urgently (SC/9392, 2008). Efforts in that area, such as the increasing of the Afghan National Police, are welcomed by Indonesia. The country also underlines the importance of political dialog and reconciliation between the different Afghan factions. Furthermore, the country recalls the key role of the international community in the efforts in Afghanistan.

**Viet Nam** defends the importance of promoting national reconciliation and of a political process oriented towards peace and stability as a way to guarantee the success of the efforts made so far in Afghanistan. Another grave problem is that of drug production and trafficking, which should be tackled through the creation of alternate livelihoods to prevent people from partaking in illicit activities. Vietnam also supports the restructuring of UNAMA

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<sup>70</sup> Further information at [http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf\\_placemat.pdf](http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf) , last accessed on September 2008

<sup>71</sup> Further information at [www.italyun.esteri.it](http://www.italyun.esteri.it), last accessed on September 2008

and the increase of its mandate (SC/9392, 2008). Finally, Viet Nam extends to Afghanistan its assistance and its experience in post-war reconstruction.

## 5. QUESTIONS TO PONDER

1. What is the full importance of Pakistan's North-western frontiers for the development of the conflict in Afghanistan? How can the International Community tackle that issue?
2. In view of the upcoming elections, what exactly must be the role of UNAMA? Should its mandate be further expanded?
3. How is the security situation in the southern provinces to be guaranteed for the elections?
4. Given the magnitude of the narcotics issue, and its importance in the financing of the insurgency, how are member states to consider the matter? What are its implications for the increasing of insecurity in South/Central Asia.
5. Given the high insecurity in most Southern districts, and the approximation of winter time, how is the delivery of humanitarian supplies to the affected population to be guaranteed?

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